UIC Law Review
Volume 55

Issue 4

Article 3

2022

Can a State Criminal Subpoena to a Sitting President Be
Trumped?: Exploring Trump v. Vance, 55 UIC L. Rev. 727 (2022)
Hudson Cross

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview
Part of the President/Executive Department Commons

Recommended Citation
Hudson Cross, Can a State Criminal Subpoena to a Sitting President Be Trumped?: Exploring Trump v.
Vance, 55 UIC L. Rev. 727 (2022)

https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview/vol55/iss4/3
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by UIC Law Open Access Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in UIC Law Review by an authorized administrator of UIC Law Open Access Repository. For
more information, please contact repository@jmls.edu.

CAN A STATE CRIMINAL SUBPOENA TO A
SITTING PRESIDENT BE TRUMPED:
EXPLORING TRUMP V. VANCE1
HUDSON CROSS*
I.
II.

INTRODUCTION ................................................................. 728
BACKGROUND ................................................................... 730
A. Absolute Immunity and the President ................... 730
1. Criminal Prosecutions and Presidential Absolute
Immunity ........................................................... 730
2. Civil Cases and Presidential Absolute Immunity
............................................................................ 731
B. Presidential Criminal Subpoenas in Federal Criminal
Proceedings............................................................... 732
C. Supremacy Clause and Federalism ........................ 735
D. Grand Juries............................................................. 737
1. Stigma and Grand Jury Secrecy Rules ............ 737
2. Harassment Relating to Grand Juries............. 738
III. CASE & COURT’S ANALYSIS.............................................. 739
A. Facts and Procedural Posture ................................. 739
B. Chief Justice Roberts’ Majority Opinion ................ 741
1. Article II and the Supremacy Clause do not
Categorically Preclude the Issuance of a State
Criminal Subpoena ............................................ 742
a. The diversion argument is rejected based on
precedent................................................... 745
b. The stigma argument is rejected based on
precedent and grand jury protections ..... 746
c. The harassment argument is rejected based
on precedent, grand jury protections, and
the Supremacy Clause ............................. 747
2. Article II and the Supremacy Clause do not
Require a Heightened Need Standard for the
Issuance of a State Criminal Subpoena ........... 749
a. First reason............................................... 749
b. Second reason ........................................... 750
c. Third reason ............................................. 750
C. Justice Kavanaugh’s Concurring Opinion ............. 751
D. Justice Thomas’ Dissenting Opinion ...................... 754
1. The President has no Absolute Immunity as to the
Issuance of the Subpoena.................................. 755
2. The Enforcement of the Subpoena ................... 755
a. The President has vast responsibilities .. 756

* J.D., UIC School of Law, 2022; I would like to thank my parents who have
constantly supported me with everything I have pursued. I would also like to
thank my constitutional law professor who ultimately gave me the inspiration
to write this Note.
1. For a similar title for which I took in part for this Note, See Steve Vladeck,
Benjamin Wittes, Can a President’s Absolute Immunity be Trumped?, LAWFARE
(May 9, 2017, 5:17 PM), www.lawfareblog.com/can-presidents-absoluteimmunity-be-trumped [perma.cc/3ZTF-6QBY].

728

UIC Law Review

[55:727

b. The courts are poorly situated ................ 757
E. Justice Alito’s Dissenting Opinion .......................... 758
1. Structural Features of the Constitution .......... 759
a. Nature and role of the Presidency .......... 759
b. Federalism ................................................ 759
2. State Criminal Subpoenas to the President .... 760
a. The role the Constitution has with respect to
the state prosecution of a President ....... 760
b. The impossibility of a state criminal
prosecution against a sitting President .. 761
c. The subpoena in this case ........................ 761
d. The heightened standard three-part test762
3. The Majority’s Opinion Provides no Protection for
the President...................................................... 763
a. Grand jury reasoning ............................... 763
b. The majority’s use of precedent............... 764
IV. PERSONAL ANALYSIS ....................................................... 765
A. The Court Should Adopt a Set Rule That Will Provide
Greater Protection to the President ....................... 766
V. CONCLUSION .................................................................... 771

I.

INTRODUCTION

It is no secret President Trump has been involved in an
incredible number of lawsuits, even before taking office. 2 Since he
took office, that did not necessarily stop.3 Many of the suits have led
to the President asserting a number of legal arguments regarding
his entitlement to absolute immunity.4 His time as President
created, and will continue to create, an outstanding amount of new
issues in the realm of constitutional law.5 This is evident by Trump
v. Vance, as the Supreme Court has never addressed the issuance
of a subpoena to a sitting President “by a local grand jury operating
under the supervision of a state court.” 6 The Court has only ever
2. See Donald Trump: Three decades 4,095 lawsuits, USA TODAY,
www.usatoday.com/pages/interactives/trump-lawsuits/
[perma.cc/AK6MLUTL] (last visited Nov. 1, 2020) (showing that President Trump has been a
part of 4,095 lawsuits at the time he ran for President in 2016).
3. See Chimène Keitner & Steve Vladeck, All the President’s Lawsuits:
Fraud, Defamation, and the Westfall Act, JUST SEC. (Sep. 25, 2020),
www.justsecurity.org/72565/all-the-presidents-lawsuits-fraud-defamation-andthe-westfall-act-jean-carroll-mary-trump [perma.cc/H6YS-EHTU] (stating that
“President Trump has been rather litigious during his time in office, leading
one author to dub him ‘Plaintiff in Chief’”).
4. Id. (“This, in turn, has prompted Trump to deploy a raft of new legal
arguments about a sitting president’s immunity from personal capacity suits.”).
5. See Peter Baker, Trump is Fighting So Many Legal Battles, It’s Hard to
Keep Track, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2019), www.nytimes.com/2019/11/06/
us/politics/donald-trump-lawsuits-investigations.html
[perma.cc/QY4EWDHQ] (stating that “[t]he legacy will live on long after Mr. Trump has left
office[,]” and “[w]hatever rulings survive his administration will govern those
that follow”).
6. Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412, 2424-25 (2020) (emphasis in original).
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addressed the issuance of subpoenas to presidents that have
“involved federal criminal proceedings.”7 In the case of Trump, the
Court finally addressed that state subpoena issue.8 On one hand,
Trump is a victory for state and local government authorities.9
However, as this Note will demonstrate, that ‘victory’ must have
limitations in order to afford more protection for the President of
the United States.10
In Trump, the Court decided whether “Article II and the
Supremacy Clause categorically preclude, or require a heightened
standard for, the issuance of a state criminal subpoena to a sitting
President.”11 Part II of this Note will begin with a background of
situations where the Court has found that the president may be
entitled to absolute immunity. It will discuss former presidents that
have been subject to federal criminal subpoenas and the Court’s
continued recognition of former Justice John Marshall’s holding
that presidents are unequivocally subject to federal subpoenas. 12
Because the instant case is a matter involving the issuance of a
state subpoena to the President, I will discuss the concept of
federalism and the Supremacy Clause. Finally, Part II will conclude
with a discussion of grand jury rules regarding secrecy and
harassment. Part III of this Note will explore the present case’s
procedural history and the Court’s analysis. This includes Chief
Justice Robert’s majority opinion, Justice Kavanaugh’s concurring
opinion, and the dissenting opinions of both Justice Thomas and
Justice Alito. This Note will particularly focus on Justice Alito’s
proposed three-step heightened standard that would be required for
a state prosecutor to establish before a state criminal subpoena
could be enforced. 13 Finally, Part IV will elaborate on that threestep heightened standard and argue it should be adopted by the
Court to afford more protection for the President of the United
States.

7. Id. at 2424 (emphasis in original).
8. Id. at 2424-25.
9. Lisa Soronen, SCOTUS Holds a Sitting President May Be Issued a State
Criminal Subpoena, NCSL BLOG (July 9, 2020), www.ncsl.org/blog/2020/07/09scotus-holds-a-sitting-president-may-be-issued-a-state-criminalsubpoena.aspx [perma.cc/9H46-AQTJ].
10. See Trump, 140 S. Ct. at 2452 (Alito, J., dissenting) (stating that “[t]he
Court’s decision threatens to impair the functioning of the Presidency and
provides no real protection against the use of the subpoena power by the
Nation’s 2,300+ local prosecutors. . .”).
11. Id. at 2420 (majority opinion).
12. See Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 702-03 (1997) (holding that federal
criminal subpoenas do not “rise to the level of constitutionally forbidden
impairment of the Executive’s ability to perform its constitutionally mandated
functions”).
13. Trump, 140 S. Ct. at 2449 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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BACKGROUND

A. Absolute Immunity and the President
The Supreme Court has addressed the issue of whether the
President is entitled to absolute immunity.14 Former United States
Presidents have encountered possible criminal prosecutions and
have faced civil suits.15
1. Criminal Prosecutions and Presidential Absolute
Immunity
There has yet to be a single case addressing whether a sitting
President can be criminally prosecuted.16 On June 17, 1972, there
was a burglary at the “Democratic National Headquarters in the
Watergate Building in Washington, D.C.” 17 It was found that the
burglars were connected to then-President Nixon and that “highlevel White House officials were involved in a cover-up.”18 During a
Senate committee hearing that followed, it was revealed “that there
was a secret taping system in the Oval Office and that presidential
conversations were routinely recorded.”19 A federal grand jury
tinkered with the idea of indicting President Nixon, but decided not
to because it was unsure if it could. 20 The suit that followed, United
States v. Nixon, involved a federal subpoena for various tapes and
documents relating to meetings in which President Nixon was a
participant.21 President Nixon claimed absolute privilege and filed
a motion to quash the third-party subpoena duces tecum22 that was
14. See generally Clinton, 520 U.S. at 692-99 (addressing President Clinton’s
claim of immunity); Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 733 (1982) (addressing
that the main issue before the Court was the scope of the immunity possessed
by the President of the United States); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683,
703-16 (1974) (addressing President Nixon’s claim of absolute privilege).
15. Compare Nixon, 418 U.S. at 687 (explaining that President Nixon was
named as an unindicted co-conspirator in a federal grand jury indictment), with
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 733 (explaining that the plaintiff sought relief in civil
damages from former President Nixon), and Clinton, 520 U.S. at 684
(explaining that a private citizen sought to recover civil damages from President
Clinton).
16. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
392 (New York: Wolters Kluwer, 6th ed. 2019).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. (“In March 1974, a federal grand jury considered indicting thenPresident Richard Nixon and decided instead to make him an unindicted coconspirator because it was unsure whether it could indict a sitting president.”).
21. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 686 (“The subpoena directed the President to produce
certain tape recordings and documents relating to his conversations with aides
and advisors.”).
22. Subpoena Duces Tecum, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“A
subpoena ordering the witness to appear in court and to bring specified
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issued by the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia.23 He based this absolute privilege assertion on the
grounds of confidentiality.24 The Court held that there was no
absolute, unqualified presidential privilege.25 The Court reasoned
that a generalized claim of presidential privilege based on a claim
of confidentiality could not overcome the interest of the fairness of
justice and that such a claim could not be upheld in a criminal
proceeding.26 The significance of Nixon is that the Court did
recognize the existence of executive privilege, but refused to make
it absolute.27
2. Civil Cases and Presidential Absolute Immunity
Eight years later, former President Nixon was involved in
another Supreme Court case revolving around the issue of a
president’s absolute immunity.28 In Nixon v. Fitzgerald, the Court
recognized a President’s “absolute immunity from damages liability
predicated on his official acts.”29 The Court reasoned that the
prospect of damages liability could “distract a President from his
public duties, to the detriment of not only the President and his
office but also the Nation that the Presidency was designed to
serve.”30 Fitzgerald held that a president or former president cannot
be sued for money damages for acts that happened during the
documents, records, or things”); see subpoena duces tecum, CORNELL LAW SCH.
LEGAL
INFO.
INST.,
www.law.cornell.edu/wex/subpoena_duces_tecum
[perma.cc/Q72A-ZTC3] (last visited June 19, 2022) (reporting that a “subpoena
duces tecum is a type of subpoena that requires the witness to produce a
document or documents pertinent to a proceeding”).
23. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 688.
24. See id. at 703 (explaining the President’s absolute privilege claim was
“that the subpoena should be quashed because it demands confidential
conversations between a President and his close advisors that it would be
inconsistent with the public interest to product”) (internal quotations omitted).
25. See id. at 706 (explaining that “the need for confidentiality of high-level
communications, without more, can[not] sustain an absolute, unqualified
Presidential privilege of immunity from judicial process under all
circumstances”).
26. See id. at 713 (concluding that “when the ground for asserting privilege
as to subpoenaed materials sought for use in a criminal trial is based only on
the generalized interest in confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the
fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administration of
criminal justice”).
27. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 16, at 390.
28. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 733.
29. See id. at 749 (explaining that this type of immunity is a “functionally
mandated incident of the President’s unique office, rooted in the constitutional
tradition of the separation of powers and supported by our history”); see also
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 16, at 393 (explaining that the Court “directly faced
the issue of money damages and held that a president, or ex-president, may not
be sued for money damages for conduct in office”).
30. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 753.
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president’s actual term in office.31
The issue of whether a president could be sued for conduct
prior to taking office came before the Court in 1997, when the Court
established in Clinton v. Jones that a sitting President has no
immunity in civil cases for acts occurring prior to the President
taking office and unrelated to the office. 32 In that case, President
Clinton argued that the risk of being preoccupied by the need to
partake in litigation entitled a sitting President to absolute
immunity from civil liability for private conduct. 33 The Court
disagreed with President Clinton but recognized that a president’s
attention is constantly faced with demands.34 The Court concluded
that “while such distractions may be vexing to those subjected to
them, they do not ordinarily implicate constitutional separation of
powers concerns.”35 The significance of this part of Clinton is that
sitting presidents may be sued for acts that occurred prior to taking
office.36

B. Presidential Criminal Subpoenas in Federal
Criminal Proceedings
Although Trump does not involve a federally issued criminal
subpoena,37 a background on presidents that have been subpoenaed
in federal criminal proceedings will be beneficial. Additionally, the
United States Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel has
taken a stance on such subpoenas.38
One of the earliest cases of a President being involved with a
31. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 16, at 394 (explaining that the holding in
Nixon v. Fitzgerald did not “resolve whether a president may be sued for
conduct prior to taking office”).
32. See Clinton, 520 U.S. at 692-93 (stating that “[t]he principal rationale
for affording certain public servants immunity from suits for money damages
arising out of their official acts is inapplicable to unofficial conduct”).
33. See id. at 697 (explaining that President Clinton “contends that he
occupies a unique office with powers and responsibilities so vast and important
that the public interest demands that he devote his undivided time and
attention to his public duties”).
34. See id. at 705, n. 40 (stating that presidents are faced with various
demands that are “some private, some political, and some as a result of official
duty. . .”).
35. Id. at 705.
36. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 16, at 395 (explaining that the Court
“unanimously and unequivocally held that presidents may be sued for acts that
allegedly occurred prior to taking office”).
37. See Trump, 140 S. Ct. at 2420 (explaining that this is a “state criminal
subpoena directed to a President”) (emphasis in original).
38. See Salvador Rizzo, Can the President be Indicted or Subpoenaed?,
WASH. POST: THE FACT CHECKER (May 22, 2018, 2:00 AM), www.
washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2018/05/22/can-the-president-beindicted-or-subpoenaed/ [perma.cc/Q3EF-8SJQ] (explaining the Office of Legal
Counsel’s memorandums regarding the criminal prosecution of a sitting
president).
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subpoena at the federal level was in 1807 with President
Jefferson.39 At that time, former Vice President Aaron Burr was on
trial for treason.40 Burr filed a motion duces tecum to obtain copies
of certain orders made for his arrest.41 The motion made was also
for a letter sent from General Wilkinson to President Jefferson
regarding Burr, that Burr believed would help defend him. 42 This
subpoena duces tecum was directed at President Jefferson to
produce the letter from General Wilkinson.43 Burr sought to
subpoena President Jefferson for documents that Burr thought
were important for his defense to the treason charge. 44 The
prosecution team charging Burr opposed the motion by arguing that
a President could not be subjected to that type of subpoena.45
Chief Justice John Marshall, presiding as Circuit Justice for
the State of Virginia, stated the President did not “stand exempt
from the general provisions of the [C]onstitution[.]” 46 Justice
Marshall compared the common law of the King of England and the
reservation of the duty to testify in response to a subpoena, and
recognized that the King’s “dignity” was “incompatible” with
appearing “under the process of the court.”47 Marshall stated that
the only way the President could possibly be exempt from
testimonial obligations, and thus, the general provisions of the
Constitution, was if the President could show that his “duties as
chief magistrate demand his whole time for national objects.” 48
However, Marshall explained that the President’s demands were
not constant and that if it were the case that the President’s duties
prevented him from being present, the court could work that out on
the return of the subpoena. 49 In regard to the documents that Burr
sought from President Jefferson, Justice Marshall realized that
those papers could contain information “the disclosure of which
would endanger the public safety,” but that those concerns would
be determined with “due consideration” upon the return of the
39. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692d).
40. For more background on Aaron Burr, see generally NANCY ISENBERG,
FALLEN FOUNDER: THE LIFE OF AARON BURR 1-557 (2007).
41. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 32.
42. Id.
43. See id. at 32, 35 (explaining that a subpoena duces tecum is when a
“witness is summoned for the purpose of bringing with him a paper in his
custody”).
44. Julia Solomon-Strauss, Summary: The Supreme Court Rules in Trump
v. Vance, LAWFARE (July 10, 2020, 8:21 PM), www.lawfareblog.com/summarysupreme-court-rules-trump-v-vance [perma.cc/6ZYN-XSPE].
45. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 32.
46. Id. at 34.
47. See id. (stating that the difference between the King and the President
is that the King can do no wrong, versus the President who is “of the people”
and elected by the people and subject to the law and the Constitution).
48. Id.
49. Id.
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subpoena.50 Marshall noted how complying with a subpoena duces
tecum is similar to complying with a normal subpoena to testify.51
Marshall held that President Jefferson was not immune from either
testifying or responding to the subpoena. 52 Marshall’s ruling
thereby established the now long-standing precedent that the
President is subject to subpoena duces tecum.53
In 1818, President Monroe received a subpoena to testify
against one of his appointees, and in 1875, President Grant
participated in a three-hour deposition in a criminal prosecution of
a political appointee.54
In 1974, President Nixon, during the Watergate scandal, was
summoned by the special prosecutor, who secured a subpoena
directing President Nixon to produce tape recordings of Oval Office
Meetings.55 The Court computed a balancing act and recognized the
importance of preserving the confidentiality of communications
between government officials, because confidentiality promotes “the
public interest in candid, objective, and even blunt or harsh
opinions in Presidential decision-making.”56 The Court stated it was
necessary that “compulsory process be available for the production
of evidence needed either by the prosecution or the defense.” 57 It
concluded that President Nixon’s “generalized assertion of privilege
must yield to the demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a
pending criminal trial.”58 This case reaffirmed Justice Marshall’s
holding in United States v. Burr59 that a president is required to
comply with a subpoena. 60
50. Id. at 37.
51. See id. at 34 (reasoning that “[t]he propriety of introducing any paper
into a case, as testimony, must depend on the character of the paper, not on the
character of the person who holds it[,]” and thus, a “subpoena duces tecum, then,
may issue to any person to whom an ordinary subpoena may issue”).
52. Solomon-Strauss, supra note 44.
53. See Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 38 (holding that “such a subpoena, as is asked,
ought to issue, if there exist any reason for supposing that the testimony may
be material, and ought to be admitted”).
54. Ronald D. Rotunda, Presidents and Ex-Presidents as Witnesses: A Brief
Historical Footnote, 1975 U. ILL. L. F. 1, 3, 5 (1975).
55. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 16, at 388 (reporting that “[o]n April 18,
1974, a subpoena duces tecum was issued, at the request of the special
prosecutor, for the president to turn over tapes and other materials to sue as
possible evidence in the upcoming criminal trial”).
56. See Nixon, 418 U.S. at 705, 708-09 (explaining that the other side of the
coin was the countervailing interests and that “the public has a right to every
man’s evidence”).
57. Id. at 709.
58. See id. at 713 (noting that this standard also means that a federal
prosecutor is required to establish a “demonstrated, specific need” for the
President’s information).
59. Burr, 25 F. Cas at 38.
60. See Clinton, 520 U.S. at 704 (stating that the Court “unequivocally and
emphatically endorsed Marshall’s position [that a subpoena duces tecum could
be directed to the President] when [the Court] held that President Nixon was
obligated to comply with a subpoena commanding him to produce certain tape
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Just one year later, in 1975, President Ford was involved with
a subpoena when his attempted assassin subpoenaed President
Ford to testify in her defense.61 The Eastern District of California
held that President Ford had to comply with the subpoena. 62
President Ford did comply and his testimony became the first
videotaped deposition of a sitting President.63 President Carter also
gave videotaped testimony to a federal grand jury. 64 President
Clinton testified three times while in office, as well.65
In addition to precedent, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”),
through various memorandums and briefs, has addressed criminal
subpoenas and the President’s immunity from the criminal
process.66 Most of the documents state that the “President enjoys
immunity from indictment and criminal prosecution while in office,”
but some state otherwise.67 Today, the DOJ stands on the ground
that its prior memoranda and briefs do not support a finding that
the President is immune from the criminal process as a whole. 68

C. Supremacy Clause and Federalism
The case of Trump is a matter involving the issuance of a state
recordings of his conversations with his aides”) (citing Nixon, 418 U.S. 683).
61. United States v. Fromme, 405 F. Supp. 578, 580 (E.D. Cal. 1975).
62. See id. at 582 (holding that “no person, even a President, is above the
law and . . . documents and other tangible evidence within the very office of the
President may be obtained for use in [appropriate] judicial proceedings [and]
where the President himself is a percipient witness to an alleged criminal act,
[he] must be amenable to subpoena as any other person would be”).
63. See id. at 583 (recognizing “the high office of the President and being
mindful of the inconvenience and burden the subpoena will impose upon him,
the court will not require the President to come to court to present his
testimony, but rather, will ‘bring’ the court to the President”).
64. RONALD ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 7.1(b)(vi)
997 (5th ed. 2012).
65. See Trump, 140 S. Ct. at 2424 (explaining that President Clinton has
testified “twice via deposition pursuant to subpoenas in federal criminal trials
of associates implicated during the Whitewater investigation, and once by video
for a grand jury investigating possible perjury”) (citing ROTUNDA & NOWAK,
supra note 64, § 7.1(c)(viii), at 1007-08).
66. See Brief of Former Department of Justice Officials as Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondents at 6, Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. 659 (2019) (No. 19635) (addressing a June 25, 1973 Memorandum; a September 24, 1973
Memorandum; an October 5, 1973 Memorandum; a July 1974 Brief; and a
January 2000 Memorandum).
67. Id. at 6-7 (recognizing that although most documents state that the
“President enjoys immunity from indictment and criminal prosecution while in
office… a number of those documents specifically explained that the President
is amenable to judicial subpoenas more generally, and that the President can
be subject to a grand jury investigation while in office”).
68. Id. at 7 (stating that “the President’s unprecedented assertion of an
absolute immunity from all criminal process finds no support in the DOJ
memoranda and briefs upon which the President seeks to rely”).
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subpoena to the President.69 This requires a discussion on
federalism and the Supremacy Clause, respectively.
The United States Constitution has a system of dual
sovereignty.70 In McCulloch v. Maryland,71 the Court held that
“states have no power . . . to retard, impede, burden, or in any
manner control the operations of the constitutional laws enacted by
Congress.”72 Further, the Court has recognized a principle that “the
activities of the Federal Government are free from regulation by
any State[,] [and] [n]o other adjustment of competing enactments
or legal principles is possible.”73
Article VI, Paragraph 2, of the United States Constitution is
commonly known as the Supremacy Clause.74 In general, the
Supremacy Clause establishes that federal law and the federal
Constitution have priority over state laws.75 The Supreme Court
has held that “[n]o State government can . . . obstruct [the]
authorized officers” of the Federal Government.76 The Clause can
also act as a constraint on federal power.77 Relating to the instant
case, and the acts of state prosecutors, the Court has stated that it
will “assume[] that state courts and prosecutors will observe
69. Trump, 140 S. Ct. at 2420 (“This case involves . . . the first state criminal
subpoena directed to a President.”) (emphasis in original).
70. Federalism, CORNELL LAW SCH. LEGAL INFO. INST., www.law.cornell.
edu/wex/federalism [perma.cc/53FZ-94D9] (last visited June, 18, 2022) (“In the
United States, the Constitution has established a system of dual sovereignty,
under which the States have surrendered many of their powers to the Federal
Government, but also retained some sovereignty.”) (internal quotations
omitted).
71. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
72. Id. at 436; see Akhil Reed Amar & Brian C. Kalt, Feature: The
Presidential Privilege Against Prosecution, 2 NEXUS J. OP. 11 (1997) (stating
that “state officials are not allowed to obstruct ‘the measures of a government
created by others as well as themselves, for the benefit of others in common
with themselves’”) (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 435-36).
73. Mayo v. United States, 319 U.S. 441, 445 (1943).
74. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby,
and Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.”).
75. See Supremacy Clause, CORNELL LAW SCH. LEGAL INFO. INST.,
www.law.cornell.edu/wex/supremacy_clause [perma.cc/WTS5-HBJU] (last
visited June 19, 2022) (reporting that the Supremacy Clause “establishes that
the federal constitution, and federal law generally, take precedence over state
laws, and even state constitutions”); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 16, at
430 (stating that “[i]f there is a conflict between federal and state law, the
federal law controls and the state law is invalidated because federal law is
supreme”).
76. Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257, 263 (1880).
77. See Bradford R. Clark, The Supremacy Clause as a Constraint on Federal
Power, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 91, 100 (2003) (discussing that the Supremacy
Clause has two goals: “to secure the supremacy of federal law and to prevent
Congress from exceeding the scope of its enumerated powers”).
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constitutional limitations.”78 If state officials and prosecutors fail to
adhere to federal law, the Clause fosters the idea that federal law
will protect the President. This is because the Court has also held
that federal courts may enjoin state officials to conform their
conduct to federal law.79

D. Grand Juries
Finally, part of the President’s argument in Trump relates to
the burdens of stigma and harassment resulting from state criminal
subpoenas.80 Because the Court’s holding discusses the various
protections that grand jury rules may or may not provide as to
stigma and harassment,81 the two issues will be discussed in turn.
1. Stigma and Grand Jury Secrecy Rules
On one hand, grand jury secrecy rules may protect any stigma
that a president may face.82 At the federal level, the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure do not allow certain individuals to disclose
the matter that is before the grand jury.83 Further, “[t]he federal
system and most states have adopted statutes or court rules [that]
impose sharp restrictions on the extent to which matters occurring
before a grand jury may be divulged” to individuals not included. 84
Federal rules and state law also reinforce the notion for individuals
not to improperly disclose grand jury matters.85
On the other hand, these restrictions are not flawless due to
the media and the federal rules not imposing disclosure restrictions
on everyone.86 For instance, “witnesses who testify before a grand
78. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
79. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155-56 (1908).
80. Trump, 140 S. Ct. at 2427-29.
81. Id.
82. See generally S. BEALE ET AL., GRAND JURY LAW AND PRACTICE § 5:1, p.
5-3 (2d ed. 2018).
83. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2)(B) (stating that “(i) a grand juror; (ii) an
interpreter; (iii) a court reporter; (iv) an operator of a recording device; (v) a
person who transcribes recorded testimony; (vi) an attorney for the government;
or (vii) a person to whom disclosure is made . . . must not disclose a matter
occurring before the grand jury”); see also Sara Kropf, What Is Grand Jury
Secrecy?, GRAND JURY TARGET (Nov. 18, 2015), www.grandjurytarget.com/
2015/11/18/what-is-grand-jury-secrecy/ [perma.cc/W3UV-EAR9] (stating that
“the prosecutor, the jurors and the court reporter may not disclose what
happens in a grand jury”) [hereinafter Kropf].
84. Beale, supra note 82.
85. See FED. R. CRIM P. 6(e)(7) (stating that “[a] knowing violation of Rule
6… may be punished as a contempt of court”); see also N.Y. Unlawful Grand
Jury Disclosure Law § 215.70 (Consol. 2020) (stating that “[u]nlawful grand
jury disclosure is a class E felony”).
86. See Nixon, 418 U.S. at 687, n. 4 (recognizing that President Nixon
requested that the District Court lift the protective order that safeguarded him
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jury . . . are under no obligation of secrecy[,]” and witnesses “can tell
anyone about what [they] said and what [they] heard during the
grand jury, including the target.”87 In New York, the decision as to
whether to disclose grand jury evidence falls under the discretion of
the judge who uses a balancing test upon the need for secrecy
against “the public interest.”88 As such, grand jury secrecy rules
may or may not protect the President from any stigma that may
result from the issuance of a subpoena. 89
2. Harassment Relating to Grand Juries
The President may be protected from any potential
harassment.90 This is because federal grand juries are barred from
engaging in “arbitrary fishing expeditions” and initiating
investigations “out of malice or an intent to harass.” 91 Further,
grand jury subpoenas can be challenged as “overly broad” or
“unreasonably burdensome.”92 However, “all that is required under
the State [of New York] and Federal Constitutions is that the
subpoenaed materials be relevant to the investigation being
conducted.”93 Additionally, the State of New York does not require
a grand jury subpoena to be supported by probable cause.94 There
are also a number of local prosecutors across the country that may
have political motivations to harass the President with state
criminal subpoenas.95 Thus, the President may or may not be
protected from harassment, but this issue and the issue of stigma

from being named as an unindicted coconspirator in the grand jury proceeding
based on the ground “that the disclosures to the news media made the reasons
for continuance of the protective order no longer meaningful”).
87. Kropf, supra note 83.
88. In re District Attorney of Suffolk Cnty., 58 N.Y.2d 436, 444 (N.Y. 1983).
89. Compare Trump, 140 S. Ct. at 2427 (stating that “longstanding rules of
grand jury secrecy aim to prevent the very stigma the President anticipates”),
with Trump, 140 S. Ct. at 2450 (Alito, J., dissenting) (stating that “grand jury
secrecy rules are of limited value as safeguards[,]” and that “[s]tate laws on
grand jury secrecy vary and often do not set out disclosure restrictions with the
same specificity as federal law”).
90. United States v. R. Enterprises, Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 299 (1991).
91. Id.
92. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas for Locals 17, 135, 257 & 608 of United Bhd.
Of Carpenters & Joiners, 72 N.Y.2d 307, 315-16 (1988).
93. Id.
94. In re Nassau Cnty. Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated June 24,
2003, 4 N.Y.3d 665, 677-78 (N.Y. 2005).
95. See Trump, 140 S. Ct. at 2447 (Alito, J., dissenting) (explaining that “[i]f
a sitting President is intensely unpopular in a particular district – and that is
a common condition – targeting the President may be an alluring and effective
electoral strategy”); see also DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
PROSECUTORS IN STATE COURTS, 2007 – STATISTICAL TABLES 1 (Dec 28, 2011),
www.bjs.ojp.gov/content/pub/pdf/psc07st.pdf [perma.cc/W44J-8XJH] (stating
that there are “2,330 chief prosecutors’ offices in the United States”)
[hereinafter BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS].
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relate to the Court’s holding in Trump.96

III.

CASE & COURT’S ANALYSIS

A. Facts and Procedural Posture
In 2018, New York County District Attorney, Cyrus Vance Jr.,
and his office, reportedly began investigating the President for what
it “opaquely describes as ‘business transactions involving multiple
individuals whose conduct may have violated state law.’” 97 One of
the issues involved illegal hush money payments that Michael
Cohen made on the President’s behalf. 98 Since then, prosecutors
have also indicated they are looking into bank and insurance fraud
by the President and his companies.99
In 2019, the New York District Attorney’s Office, acting on
behalf of a grand jury, “served a subpoena duces tecum… on Mazars
USA, LLP, the personal accounting firm of President Donald J.
Trump.”100 District Attorney Vance issued a grand jury subpoena to
Mazars, who possesses financial and tax records, because it
performed accounting services for President Trump and his
organizations.101 The subpoena ordered Mazars to produce financial
records relating to the President and businesses affiliated with him,
including tax returns.102
The President, in his personal capacity, sued the District
Attorney and Mazars in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York to enjoin the enforcement of the
subpoena.103 The President argued that under Article II and the
Supremacy Clause, he, as sitting United States President, has
96. Trump, 140 S. Ct. at 2427-29 (majority opinion).
97. Trump, 140 S. Ct. at 2420 (quoting Brief of Respondent at 2, Trump v.
Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412 (2020) (No. 19-635)).
98. See Mark Joseph Stern, Donald Trump’s Fight to Hide His Tax Returns
Has Failed, SLATE (Aug. 20, 2020, 12:07 PM), www.slate.com/news-andpolitics/2020/08/donald-trump-john-roberts-tax-returns-vance.html [perma.cc/
L58D-KARA] (stating that “Cy Vance reportedly began investigating [the
President] in 2018 for the illegal hush money payments that Michael Cohen
made on his behalf”) [hereinafter Stern]; see also Darren Sameulsohn, Guiliani:
Cohen is not Trump’s lawyer anymore ‘as far as we know’, POLITICO (May 11,
2018, 2:01 PM), www.politico.com/story/2018/05/11/michael-cohen-not-trumpattorney-583902 [perma.cc/AM8K-LL3W] (explaining that Michael Cohen was
the “longtime personal attorney to President Donald Trump” and represented
the President in regard to the illegal hush money payments that “Cohen
[apparently] had made to the adult film star Stormy Daniels just weeks before
the 2016 presidential election”).
99. Stern, supra note 98.
100. Trump, 140 S. Ct. at 2420.
101. Trump v. Vance, 941 F.3d 631, 634 (2nd Cir. 2019).
102. Trump, 140 S. Ct. at 2420.
103. Id.
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absolute immunity from the state criminal process. 104 He sought
declaratory judgment to make the subpoena invalid and
unenforceable while he was in office and also to permanently enjoin
District Attorney Vance from being able to take any action in
enforcing the subpoena. 105 The district court did not exercise
jurisdiction based on the abstention doctrine set forth in Younger v.
Harris106 and dismissed the case.107 The district court alternatively
held that the President was not entitled to injunctive relief.108
In an appeal to the Second Circuit, the President argued that
the district court erred in dismissing his complaint based on the
Younger abstention, and that it erred in denying the preliminary
injunction on the question of absolute immunity.109 The Second
Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal of the complaint
regarding the Younger abstention issue.110 Nonetheless, the Second
Circuit agreed with the district court’s alternative holding that
denied the preliminary injunction as to the immunity issue. 111
Further, it addressed and rejected the Solicitor General’s argument,
on behalf of the United States as amicus curiae, that a state grand
jury subpoena needed to satisfy a heightened standard of need. 112
The Supreme Court granted certiorari.113 On July 9, 2020, the
Supreme Court issued its decision in Trump.114 Chief Justice
Roberts announced the decision of the Court, in which Justice
Ginsburg, Justice Breyer, Justice Sotomayor, and Justice Kagan

104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See generally Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (setting forth an
abstention doctrine, which, in part, established that federal courts are required
to not exercise jurisdiction when a plaintiff sought to enjoin a state criminal
prosecution that was still ongoing).
107. Trump v. Vance, 395 F. Supp. 3d 283, 290 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (abstaining
from exercising jurisdiction because of Younger).
108. Id. at 290.
109. Trump, 941 F.3d at 634.
110. See id. (holding that “Younger abstention does not extend to the
circumstances of this case”).
111. See id. at 634, 640 (holding “that the President has not shown a
likelihood of success on the merits of his claims sufficient to warrant injunctive
relief[,]” because “presidential immunity does not bar the enforcement of a state
grand jury subpoena directing a third party to produce non-privileged material,
even when the subject matter under investigation pertains to the President”).
112. See id. at 645-46 (reasoning that the heightened need test, which is
taken from precedent addressing communications within the Executive Branch
“has little bearing on a subpoena that, as here, does not seek any information
subject to executive privilege . . . in his private capacity and disconnected from
the discharge of his constitutional obligations”).
113. Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. 659 (2019) (“The petition for a writ of
certiorari is granted.”); Trump, 140 S. Ct. 2412, 2420 (“We granted certiorari to
decide whether Article II and the Supremacy Clause categorically preclude, or
require a heightened standard for, the issuance of a state criminal subpoena to
a sitting President.”).
114. Trump, 140 S. Ct. at 2412.
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joined.115 Justice Kavanaugh wrote a concurring opinion joined by
Justice Gorsuch.116 Both Justice Thomas and Justice Alito
separately dissented to the Court’s judgment.117 The Court
addressed two issues: (1) the President’s absolute immunity
argument; and (2) the Solicitor General’s argument that this type
of state subpoena must meet a heightened standard of need. 118 The
majority rejected both arguments.119 All nine Justices agreed that
the President was not absolutely immune from the issuance of a
state criminal subpoena for his personal financial records.120 As to
the Solicitor General’s heightened standard of need argument,
Justice Thomas, in his dissent, joined the majority’s holding that
the subpoena was not required to meet such a standard.121

B. Chief Justice Roberts’ Majority Opinion
In writing for the Court’s majority, Chief Justice Roberts
makes two big holdings: (1) that the President is not entitled to
absolute immunity under Article II and the Supremacy Clause; and
(2) that a heightened standard of need is not required for the
issuance of a state criminal subpoena to a sitting President.122 Chief
Justice Roberts first addresses the President’s argument of absolute
immunity, and then confronts the Solicitor General’s argument of a
heightened standard of need. 123
Before diving into the issues, Chief Justice Roberts opens his
opinion by emphasizing the long-standing principle in our country’s
judicial system that “the public has a right to every man’s
evidence[,]” including “the President of the United States.”124 He
115. Id. at 2420-31.
116. Id. at 2431-33 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
117. Id. at 2433-39 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Id. at 2439-52 (Alito, J.,
dissenting).
118. Soronen, supra note 9.
119. See Solomon-Strauss, supra note 44 (stating that the Court “reject[ed]
both the [P]resident’s position that he was absolutely immune from a subpoena
from the New York County District Attorney’s Office and the [S]olicitor
[G]eneral’s position that the subpoena should be subject to a heightened need
standard”).
120. Id. (“Writing in four separate opinions, the Justices were unanimous
that President Trump was not absolutely immune from a state court criminal
subpoena to a third party for his financial records.”).
121. Id. (“And the five Justices in the majority, along with [Justice Thomas]
in his dissent, agreed that the subpoena did not have to be subject to a
heightened need standard.”).
122. See Trump, 140 S. Ct. at 2429 (holding that the Court “cannot conclude
that absolute immunity is necessary or appropriate under Article II or the
Supremacy Clause” and that it “disagree[s]” with the Solicitor General’s
argument that “a state grand jury subpoena seeking a President’s private
papers must satisfy a heightened need standard”).
123. Id. at 2425-29, 2429-31.
124. Id. at 2420 (“In our judicial system, the public has a right to every man’s
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then recognizes the notable part of this case – this being the first
time the Court has ever been confronted with a “state criminal
subpoena directed to a President.”125
1. Article II and the Supremacy Clause do not Categorically
Preclude the Issuance of a State Criminal Subpoena
Chief Justice Roberts begins with a history lesson on the
background of the 1807 trial of Aaron Burr.126 That case, explained
in more detail in Part II(B)(1) of this Note, involved Burr, the former
Vice-President, attempting to subpoena President Jefferson for
documents that he thought would be beneficial for his defense. 127
Chief Justice John Marshall held that President Jefferson was not
immune to Burr’s subpoena nor immune from responding to the
subpoena since the President did not “stand exempt from the
general provisions of the [C]onstitution[.]”128 Chief Justice Roberts
presumably lays out this background to emphasize Burr’s holding
that presidents are subject to subpoena, even when called to
testify.129 Chief Justice Roberts then sets out the precedent of
former Presidents Monroe, Grant, Ford, Carter and Clinton who
accepted the Burr ruling of being subject to subpoenas and to
testify.130
He finishes his discussion of precedent that has reaffirmed
Marshall’s holding in Burr by referring to President Nixon in the
1974 Watergate scandal.131 As Chief Justice Roberts explains,
evidence” and “[s]ince the earliest days of the Republic, every man has included
the President of the United States.”) (internal quotations omitted); SolomonStrauss, supra note 44 (“The majority opinion emphasizes the common law
heritage of the principle that the public has a right to every man’s evidence –
including the president’s.”) (internal quotations omitted).
125. Trump, 140 S. Ct. at 2420 (“This case involves – so far as [the Court]
and the parties can tell – the first state criminal subpoena directed to a
President.”) (emphasis in original).
126. Solomon-Strauss, supra note 44 (“Roberts opens with an extended
description of the history and background of the prosecution of Aaron Burr for
treason in 1807.”).
127. Id. (“In that case, Burr sought to subpoena President Thomas Jefferson
for documents that he believed were important for his defense.”).
128. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 32.
129. See Trump, 140 S. Ct. at 2423 (stating that “[i]n the two centuries since
the Burr trial, successive Presidents have accepted Marshall’s ruling that the
Chief Executive is subject to subpoena”); see also Solomon-Strauss, supra note
44 (stating that “Roberts identifies the Burr case as the foundation of a
consensus that has emerged in the case law in the 200 years since the [Burr]
ruling[,]… including when they are called to testify in a criminal proceeding”).
130. Trump, 140 S. Ct. at 2423-24 (“In 1818, President Monroe received a
subpoena to testify . . . [and] offered to sit for a deposition and ultimately
submitted answers to written interrogatories” and “[f]ollowing Monroe’s lead,
his successors have uniformly agreed to testify when called in criminal
proceedings, provided they could do so at a time and place of their choosing.”).
131. Id. at 2424 (“The bookend to Marshall’s ruling came in 1974 when the
question he never had to decide – whether to compel the disclosure of official
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President Nixon “moved to quash” a subpoena duces tecum secured
by the appointed Special Prosecutor that “direct[ed] Nixon to
produce, among other things, tape recordings of Oval Office
meetings” relating to the break-in at the Watergate Complex.132 The
Court rejected Nixon’s argument that “the Constitution provides an
absolute privilege of confidentiality to all presidential
communications.”133 Chief Justice Roberts references Nixon to
reiterate that Presidents are subject to subpoena, even when it
comes to official, privileged communications.134
Chief Justice Roberts addresses the President’s absolute
immunity argument in this case, the argument being that the
distinction between a federal subpoena and a state subpoena makes
all the difference.135 The President’s contention is that having to
comply with a state subpoena would “pose a unique threat of
impairment” that would “categorically impair a President’s
performance of his Article II functions.”136 In a footnote, Chief
Justice Roberts makes it clear that although the subpoena in this
case was issued to a third-party, for purposes of immunity, it is
effectively issued to the President.137 President Trump argues that
under the Supremacy Clause and because of his obligations as the
Chief Executive under Article II, “he has absolute immunity from
state criminal subpoenas.”138 Chief Justice Roberts explains how the
Solicitor General does not necessarily argue the President is
entitled to absolute immunity, but instead asserts the subpoena
should meet a heightened need standard, and that it was not met. 139
The heightened need standard would “require a threshold showing”
that the sought after evidence is necessary and needed while the
communications over the objection of [President Nixon] – came to a head.”).
132. Id.
133. Id. (citing Nixon, 418 U.S. 683).
134. See id. (stating that the Court’s decision in Nixon was “a decision [the
Court] later described as ‘unequivocally and emphatically endors[ing]
Marshall’s’ holding that Presidents are subject to subpoena”) (quoting Clinton,
520 U.S. at 704).
135. Id. at 2425 (“In the President’s view, that distinction makes all the
difference.”).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 2425, n. 5 (“While the subpoena was directed to the President’s
accounting firm, the parties agree that the papers at issue belong to the
President and that Mazars is merely the custodian[,]” and therefore, “for
purposes of immunity, it is functionally a subpoena issued to the President. . .”).
138. Solomon-Strauss, supra note 44 (emphasis in original).
139. Trump, 140 S. Ct. at 2425 (“The Solicitor General, arguing on behalf of
the United States, agrees with much of the President’s reasoning but does not
commit to his bottom line [and] [i]nstead . . . urges [the Court] to resolve this
case by holding that a state grand jury subpoena for a sitting President’s
personal records must, at the very least, ‘satisfy a heightened standard of need,’
which the Solicitor General contends was not met here.”) (quoting Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 26, 29, Trump v.
Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412 (2020) (No. 19-635)).
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President is still in office.140
In terms of absolute immunity, Chief Justice Roberts briefly
explains how Article II gives protection to the President.141 Because
“Article II guarantees the independence of the Executive Branch[,]”
and because that role gives the President a wide range of duties,
such as “faithfully executing the laws to commanding the Armed
Forces,” the Court has given the President “protections that
safeguard the President’s ability to perform his vital functions.” 142
He explains that this protection is enhanced by the Constitution
and the concept of federalism.143 Chief Justice Roberts circles back
to Chief Justice John Marshall’s holding in Burr and the cases that
followed which established that “federal criminal subpoenas do not
‘rise to the level of constitutionally forbidden impairment of the
Executive’s ability to perform its constitutionally mandated
functions.’”144 In other words, based on precedent, criminal
subpoenas issued by “federal authorities do not interfere with the
president’s constitutional functions.”145
However, the President’s claim is that “state criminal
subpoenas pose a unique threat of impairment and thus demand
greater protection.”146 Notably, Chief Justice Roberts makes it clear
that the President makes a “categorical argument” and does not
argue specifically about “this subpoena[.]”147 The President argues
that diversion, stigma, and harassment are three reasons why he
should be entitled to absolute immunity.148 Chief Justice Roberts
140. Id. at 2429 (“The Solicitor General would require a threshold showing
that the evidence sought is ‘critical’ for ‘specific charging decisions’ and that the
subpoena is a ‘last resort,’ meaning the evidence is ‘not available from any other
source’ and is needed ‘now, rather than at the end of the President’s term.’”)
(quoting Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at
29, 32, Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412 (2020) (No. 19-635)).
141. See id. at 2425 (stating that “Article II guarantees the independence of
the Executive Branch” and the President’s duties under Article II “are of
unrivaled gravity and breadth[,]” which “safeguard the President’s ability to
perform his vital functions”).
142. Id. (citing Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 749) (The President “is entitled to
absolute immunity from damages liability predicated on his official acts”);
Nixon, 418 U.S. at 708 (Presidential communications are privileged).
143. Id. (“In addition, the Constitution guarantees ‘the entire independence
of the General Government from any control by the respective States[,]’” which
means “that States also lack the power to impede the President’s execution of
those laws.”) (quoting Farmers and Mechanics Sav. Bank of Minneapolis v.
Minnesota, 232 U.S. 516, 521 (1914)).
144. Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Clinton, 520 U.S. at 702-03).
145. Solomon-Strauss, supra note 44 (emphasis in original).
146. Trump, 140 S. Ct. at 2425 (emphasis in original).
147. Id. (“To be clear, the President does not contend here that this
subpoena, in particular, is impermissibly burdensome[,] [and] [i]nstead he
makes a categorical argument about the burdens generally associated with
state criminal subpoenas[.]”) (emphasis in original).
148. Soronen, supra note 9 (“Regarding absolute immunity, Trump pointed
to diversion, stigma and harassment as the reasons he should be immune from
state subpoenas.”).

2022]

Exploring Trump v. Vance

745

rejects each reason either because of existing precedent or because
of protections that are already in place for grand jury
investigations.149
a. The diversion argument is rejected based on precedent
Chief Justice Roberts first looks at the President’s claim that
complying with the state criminal subpoena would distract him
from his duties as the Chief Executive.150 Chief Justice Roberts
notes that in Clinton, President Clinton argued that he should be
immune from civil liability for private conduct, 151 and that the
Court “expressly rejected immunity based on distraction alone[.]” 152
Because President Trump’s main argument regarding distraction is
based on the Court’s holding in Fitzgerald, Chief Justice Roberts
then clarifies what the Court’s primary concern was in that case –
that the President “might carry out his duties differently if he was
subject to potential civil liability, not that he would be distracted by
ongoing litigation.”153 Chief Justice Roberts states that the “same is
true of criminal subpoenas[,]” because a “properly tailored criminal
subpoena” will not distract a President from his constitutional
duties.154 Interestingly, although Chief Justice Roberts states in an
earlier footnote that the subpoena at issue was “functionally a
subpoena issued to the President[,]” he asserts that when a
subpoena is targeted at someone else, that the burden will be even
lighter.155
Chief Justice Roberts writes that “the President is not seeking
immunity from the diversion occasioned by the prospect of future

149. Id. (“The majority opinion rejected these arguments as foreclosed by
precedent or, in the case of harassment, manageable due to protections already
in place to limit grand jury investigations.”).
150. Trump, 140 S. Ct. at 2425-26 (“The President’s primary contention,
which the Solicitor General supports, is that complying with state criminal
subpoenas would necessarily divert the Chief Executive from his duties.”).
151. Clinton, 520 U.S. at 692.
152. Trump, 140 S. Ct. at 2426; Solomon-Strauss, supra note 44 (“First
[Chief Justice Roberts] notes that Clinton v. Jones, in which President Clinton
argued that he should be immune from civil liability for private conduct,
expressly rejected immunity based on distraction alone.”) (internal quotations
omitted).
153. Solomon-Strauss, supra note 44.
154. Trump, 140 S. Ct. at 2426 (“Just as a ‘properly managed’ civil suit is
generally ‘unlikely to occupy any substantial amount of’ a President’s time or
attention, two centuries of experience confirm that a properly tailored criminal
subpoena will not normally hamper the performance of the President’s
constitutional duties.”) (quoting Clinton, 520 U.S. at 702).
155. Id. at 2425, n. 5, 2426 (“If anything, we expect that in the mine run of
cases, where a President is subpoenaed during a proceeding targeting someone
else . . . the burden on a President will ordinarily be lighter than the burden of
defending against a civil suit.”).
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criminal liability.”156 Because the President “concedes that
prosecutors may investigate the [P]resident so that they may
possibly charge him after he steps down from office, he cannot
assert that the distraction of the investigation itself is
impermissible.”157 Instead, Chief Justice Roberts explains the
President must assert that “the additional distraction caused by the
subpoena” interferes with his constitutional duties.158 However,
Chief Justice Roberts states that this argument would fail as it
would conflict with the previous “200 years of precedent
establishing that Presidents, and their official communications, are
subject to judicial process, even when the President is under
investigation[.]”159 As such, Chief Justice Roberts rejects the
President’s diversion argument based on the Court’s precedent.160
b. The stigma argument is rejected based on precedent and
grand jury protections
Chief Justice Roberts next addresses the President’s stigma
argument that “being subpoenaed will undermine his leadership at
home and abroad[,]” and also notes that the Solicitor General does
not join the President in this argument.161 Chief Justice Roberts
writes that even if the President’s “tarnished reputation” is a
legitimate argument, there is “nothing inherently stigmatizing
about a President” having to do what every other citizen has to do
in complying with an investigation.162 He then reasons that because
prior presidents have dealt with reputational issues in federal
cases, the same should be true in state court cases, and as such, the
President must comply with the duties of an investigation.163
156. Id. at 2426 (emphasis in original).
157. Solomon-Strauss, supra note 44 (emphasis in original).
158. Trump, 140 S. Ct. at 2427 (emphasis in original); Solomon-Strauss,
supra note 44.
159. Trump, 140 S. Ct. at 2427 (citing Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 34; Nixon, 418 U.S.
at 706).
160. Soronen, supra note 9 (“The majority opinion rejected [this] argument
as foreclosed by precedent…”).
161. See Trump, 140 S. Ct. at 2427 (stating that “the Solicitor General does
not endorse this argument, perhaps because [the Court] [has] twice denied
absolute immunity claims by Presidents in cases involving allegations of serious
misconduct”) (citing Clinton, 520 U.S. at 685; Nixon, 418 U.S. at 687).
162. Id. at 2427 (“But even if a tarnished reputation were a cognizable
impairment, there is nothing inherently stigmatizing about a President
performing ‘the citizen’s normal duty of . . . furnishing information relevant’ to
a criminal investigation.”) (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 691
(1972)).
163. See id. (stating that the Court cannot “accept that the risk of association
with persons or activities under criminal investigation can absolve a President
of such an important public duty[,]” because “[p]rior Presidents have weathered
these associations in federal cases, and there is no reason to think any
attendant notoriety is necessarily greater in state court proceedings”); see also
Solomon-Strauss, supra note 44 (stating that “Roberts states that there is no
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Chief Justice Roberts also recognizes that “longstanding rules
of grand jury secrecy would “prevent the very stigma the President
anticipates.”164 These rules would protect the President even
though “the current suit has cast the Mazars subpoena into the
spotlight.”165 Chief Justice Roberts recognizes that these rules are
obviously not perfect, but that disclosure penalties would still
protect the President from any potential stigma.166 Thus, Chief
Justice Roberts rejects this claim on the bases of precedent and
grand jury protections that are in place.167
c.

The harassment argument is rejected based on
precedent, grand jury protections, and the Supremacy
Clause

Chief Justice Roberts rejects the President’s final claim, in
which the Solicitor General joins, that the President will be subject
to harassment by state criminal subpoenas.168 The President’s
argument is based on the grounds that local and state prosecutors
are more inclined than their federal counterparts to be politically
motivated and harass the President.169 The President reasons that
local and state prosecutors respond to their localities and their
interests, and “might ‘use criminal process to register their
dissatisfaction with’ the President.”170 The President claims state
criminal subpoenas would not allow the President to properly deal
with the States and would “threaten the independence” of the
office.171
difference between the reputational costs of such process in federal cases and in
state court”).
164. Trump, 140 S. Ct. at 2427.
165. Id.
166. See id. (stating that “[o]f course, disclosure restrictions are not
perfect[,]” but that “those who make unauthorized disclosures regarding a
grand jury subpoena do so at their peril”); see also Solomon-Strauss, supra note
44 (stating that Roberts writes that there “are disclosure rules and penalties to
protect the [P]resident from any stigma that could result from the revelation
that his information was subpoenaed”).
167. Soronen, supra note 9.
168. Trump, 140 S. Ct. at 2427 (“Finally, the President and the Solicitor
General warn that subjecting Presidents to state criminal subpoenas will make
them ‘easily identifiable target[s]’ for harassment.”) (quoting Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. at 753); Solomon-Strauss, supra note 44 (“Finally, the chief justice rejects
the claim that the [P]resident will be subject to harassment by state criminal
subpoenas.”).
169. Solomon-Strauss, supra note 44 (“Trump had warned that local
prosecutors are more likely than federal prosecutors to play politics and fail to
respect the office of the presidency.”).
170. Trump, 140 S. Ct. at 2428 (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 16, Trump v.
Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412 (2020) (No. 19-635)).
171. Id. at 2427-28 (“The President and the Solicitor General . . . argue that
state criminal subpoenas pose a heightened risk and could undermine the
President’s ability to ‘deal fearlessly and impartially’ with the States.”) (quoting
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Chief Justice Roberts recognizes subpoenas could potentially
be harassing in “certain circumstances,” and that there is the
potential for local or state prosecutors to have political
implications.172 But, Chief Justice Roberts explains and cites the
Court’s precedent regarding grand juries and investigations and
how the law protects any potential harassment the President might
face.173 Chief Justice Roberts gives two explanations of these
protections: (1) grand jury rules; and (2) the Supremacy Clause. 174
In regards to grand jury rules, Chief Justice Roberts explains that
“grand juries are prohibited from engaging in ‘arbitrary fishing
expeditions’ and initiating investigations ‘out of malice or an intent
to harass.’”175 He explains that even if harassment did occur in state
courts, the President would have protection in federal court since
federal courts can interfere when it is found “that the state
proceeding is motivated by a desire to harass or is conducted in bad
faith.”176 In terms of the Supremacy Clause protections, Chief
Justice Roberts states the Clause “prohibits state judges and
prosecutors from interfering with a President’s official duties.”177
Further, courts “generally ‘assume[] that state courts and
prosecutors will observe constitutional limitations’” provided by the
Supremacy Clause.178 This is because the Clause fosters the notion
that state governments cannot interfere with the “authorized
officers” of the Federal Government.179 Even if these protections
fail, Chief Justice Roberts explains that federal law allows
presidents to make challenges in federal court, which is precisely
what the President had done in this case.180
Chief Justice Roberts concludes this part of his opinion by
stating that the grand jury safeguards in place and precedent do not
entitle the President to absolute immunity under Article II or the
Supremacy Clause, and that the entire Court agrees as to this
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 752).
172. Id. at 2428.
173. See Solomon-Strauss, supra note 44 (stating that “Roberts cites the
Supreme Court’s precedent” that would protect a President from a subpoena
that “is intended to harass…”).
174. Trump, 140 S. Ct. at 2428.
175. Id. (quoting R. Enterprises, Inc., 498 U.S. at 299); Virag v. Hynes, 54
N.Y.2d 437, 442-43 (1981).
176. Trump, 140 S. Ct. at 2428 (stating that “in the event of such
harassment, a President would be entitled to the protection of federal courts[,]”
and that although “[t]he policy against federal interference in state criminal
proceedings [is] strong, [it] allows ‘intervention in those cases where the District
Court properly finds that the state proceeding is motivated by a desire to harass
or is conducted in bad faith’”) (quoting Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592,
611 (1975)).
177. Id.
178. Id. (quoting Dombrowski, 380 U.S. at 484).
179. Davis, 100 U.S. at 263.
180. Trump, 140 S. Ct. at 2428 (“Failing that, federal law allows a President
to challenge any allegedly unconstitutional influence in a federal forum, as the
President has done here.”).
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point.181
2. Article II and the Supremacy Clause do not Require a
Heightened Need Standard for the Issuance of a State
Criminal Subpoena
Chief Justice Roberts next addresses the Solicitor General’s
argument for a heightened need standard.182 The Solicitor General
argues that a state grand jury subpoena for a sitting President’s
personal records must, at a minimum, satisfy a heightened need
standard, which he claims was not met in this case.183 This standard
would require the subpoena to show that evidence is “critical” for
“specific charging decisions” and must show that evidence needs to
be available now, while the President is still in office.184 Chief
Justice Roberts rejects the argument and cites three reasons for
why a state grand jury subpoena does not need to meet this
standard.185 He reasons that, (1) the heightened standard is
“designed for official documents[,]” not personal papers, (2) the
heightened standard for state subpoenas is not “necessary for the
Executive to fulfill his Article II functions[,]” and (3) the public
interest favors “comprehensive access to evidence.”186 In doing so,
Chief Justice Roberts points out and disputes Justice Alito’s
dissenting arguments with each reason.187
a. First reason
The first reason is that “such a heightened standard would
extend protection designed for official documents to the President’s
private papers.”188 This standard is taken from executive privilege
cases, which have involved official papers, not personal papers that
are present in this case.189 Chief Justice Roberts recognizes that this
181. See id. at 2429 (explaining that “[g]iven these safeguards and the
Court’s precedents, [the Court] cannot conclude that absolute immunity is
necessary or appropriate under Article II or the Supremacy Clause[,]” and that
“the Court is unanimous” as to this point).
182. Solomon-Strauss, supra note 44.
183. Trump, 140 S. Ct. at 2429.
184. See id. (explaining that the “Solicitor General would require a threshold
showing that the evidence sought is ‘critical’ for ‘specific charging decisions’ and
that the subpoena is a ‘last resort,’ meaning the evidence is ‘not available from
any other source’ and is needed ‘now, rather than at the end of the President’s
term’”) (quoting Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at 29, 32, Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412 (2020) (No. 19-635)).
185. Soronen, supra note 9.
186. Trump, 140 S. Ct. at 2429-30.
187. Id. at 2429-31.
188. Id. at 2429.
189. Solomon-Strauss, supra note 44 (“This standard is imported from
executive privilege cases, like United States v. Nixon, which concerned official
(rather than personal) papers.”).
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would contradict important language set forth in Burr.190 In Burr,
Chief Justice Marshall explained “that if [President] Jefferson
invoked presidential privilege over executive communications, the
court would not ‘proceed against the president as against an
ordinary individual.’”191 Instead, Marshall explained that the court
would “require an affidavit from the defense that ‘would clearly
show the paper to be essential to the justice of the case.’”192 Chief
Justice Roberts states that Justice Alito joins the Solicitor General
in wanting to apply this standard to the personal papers in this
case, but that the two ignore an important part of Burr, which is
that if there is not an official paper at stake, then the individual
subject to the subpoena is in the same situation as everyone else. 193
b. Second reason
The second reason for why Chief Justice Roberts disagrees is
because he is “not convinced that the heightened need standard is
necessary for the [P]resident to fulfill his constitutional functions in
the state context, given that the standard is not applicable in the
federal context.”194 He writes that the Solicitor General and Justice
Alito have not “established that heightened protection against state
subpoenas is necessary for the Executive to fulfill his Article II
functions.”195
c.

Third reason

The third reason is that “in the absence of a need to protect the
Executive, the public interest in fair and effective law enforcement
cuts in favor of comprehensive access to evidence.”196 This public
policy argument reasons that a state grand jury needs the ability to
conduct an investigation in a timely manner for the interest of the
public.197 Chief Justice Roberts explains that “[r]equiring a state
grand jury to meet a heightened standard of need would hobble the
grand jury’s ability to acquire ‘all information that might possibly

190. Id.
191. Trump, 140 S. Ct. at 2429 (quoting Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 192).
192. Id. (quoting Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 192).
193. Id. (“But this argument does not account for the relevant passage from
Burr: ‘If there be a paper in the possession of the executive, which is not of an
official nature, he must stand, as respects that paper, in nearly the same
situation with any other individual.’”) (quoting Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 191).
194. Solomon-Strauss, supra note 44.
195. Trump, 140 S. Ct. at 2429.
196. Id. at 2430.
197. See Solomon-Strauss, supra note 44 (stating that the “the public has an
important interest in fair and effective law enforcement – which requires the
grand jury’s ability to investigate and the state’s ability to follow important
leads in a timely fashion and potentially uncover exculpatory evidence”)
(internal quotations omitted).
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bear on its investigation.’”198 He rejects part of Alito’s dissenting
argument by stating that “[r]ejecting a heightened need standard
does not leave Presidents with ‘no real protection.’”199
Chief Justice Roberts continues to explain how a President
does have protection absent this type of standard, including the
ability to challenge this type of subpoena in state or federal court. 200
He writes that the Constitution would provide the President the
ability to raise “subpoena-specific constitutional challenges, in
either a state or federal forum.”201 The President could “argue that
compliance with a particular subpoena would impede his
constitutional duties.”202
The Chief Justice finishes his opinion by noting that the
arguments raised by the parties were limited to addressing
“absolute immunity and heightened need.”203 He remands the case
to the district court and notes the President will be able to raise
other arguments directly about the subpoena, but not arguments
about how he is “absolutely immune or that the subpoena must
meet a heightened need standard.”204 Although Chief Justice
Roberts gives the President an opportunity to raise these objections,
his decision was “diplomatic[,]” in that it “confirmed that no one is
above the law without immediately forcing [the President] to
comply with the law.”205

C. Justice Kavanaugh’s Concurring Opinion
In a concurring opinion joined by Justice Gorsuch, Justice
Kavanaugh agrees with the majority that the President does not
have absolute immunity and that the case should be remanded to
the district court.206 As such, Justice Kavanaugh concurs in the
198. Trump, 140 S. Ct. at 2430 (quoting R. Enterprises, Inc., 498 U.S. at
297).
199. Id. (quoting Trump, 140 S. Ct. at 2450 (Alito, J., dissenting)).
200. Id. (“To start, a President may avail himself of the same protections
available to every other citizen . . . includ[ing] the right to challenge the
subpoena on any grounds permitted by state law, which usually include bad
faith and undue burden or breadth.”).
201. Id.; see also Solomon-Strauss, supra note 44 (“Even though the majority
held that the president is not absolutely immune and that a state grand jury
subpoena for presidential information is not subject to a heightened need
standard, [Chief Justice Roberts] emphasizes that the president was still
protected by state law and the Constitution.”).
202. Trump, 140 S. Ct. at 2430.
203. Id. at 2431.
204. Solomon-Strauss, supra note 44.
205. Stern, supra note 98.
206. See Trump, 140 S. Ct. at 2431 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (agreeing
with the Court’s conclusions that “a President does not possess absolute
immunity from a state criminal subpoena . . . [and] that this case should be
remanded to the District Court, where the President may raise constitutional
and legal objections to the subpoena as appropriate”).
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judgment.207 However, Justice Kavanaugh differs from the majority
in that he would have adopted the “demonstrated, specific need”
standard set forth in Nixon.208
Justice Kavanaugh begins by explaining that this case should
be framed as a conflict between the State’s interests in this type of
criminal investigation and the President’s Article II interests.209 He
recognizes the Court’s precedent that has held the President is not
“above the law[,]” but also recognizes the President is not “an
ordinary litigant.”210 Justice Kavanaugh lays out the Court’s
precedent demonstrating the principle that the President is not “an
ordinary litigant.”211 He states that the real question in this case is
“how to balance the State’s interests and the Article II interests.”212
He addresses this question by explaining the “demonstrated,
specific need” standard set forth in Nixon.213 He explains that this
standard has worked in the past and that it “accommodates both
the interests of the criminal process and the Article II interests of
the Presidency.”214 Looking at the State’s interests, Justice
Kavanaugh explains that this test ensures that a prosecutor has a
sufficient interest that is important enough to justify subpoenaing
a President.215 This standard also balances the President’s Article
II interests because it ensures that a prosecutor can “obtain a
President’s information only in certain defined circumstances.” 216
207. Solomon-Strauss, supra note 44.
208. Trump, 140 S. Ct. at 2432 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (citing Nixon,
418 U.S. at 713).
209. Id. at 2431 (“The dispute over this grand jury subpoena reflects a
conflict between a State’s interest in criminal investigation and a President’s
Article II interest in performing his or her duties without undue interference.”).
210. See id. at 2432 (stating that the Court has held that “no one is above
the law” which applies to the President, but “[a]t the same time, in light of
Article II of the Constitution, this Court has repeatedly declared – and the Court
indicates again today – that a court may not proceed against a President as it
would against an ordinary litigant”).
211. See id. at 2432 (citing Cheney v. United States Dist. Court for D.C., 542
U.S. 367, 381-82 (2004)) (“In no case would a court be required to proceed
against the president as against an ordinary individual.”); Clinton, 520 U.S. at
704, n. 39 (“[A] court may not ‘proceed against the president as against an
ordinary individual.’”) (quoting Nixon, 418 U.S. at 715); Nixon, 418 U.S. at 715
(“In no case of this kind would a court be required to proceed against the
president as against an ordinary individual.”); United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas.
187, 192 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,694) (“In no case of this kind would a court
be required to proceed against the president as against an ordinary
individual.”).
212. Id. at 2432.
213. Id. (“The longstanding precedent that has applied to federal criminal
subpoenas for official, privileged Executive Branch information is United States
v. Nixon[,]” which “requires that a prosecutor establish a ‘demonstrated, specific
need’ for the President’s information.”) (quoting Nixon, 418, U.S. at 713).
214. Id.
215. Id. (“The Nixon standard ensures that a prosecutor’s interest in
subpoenaed information is sufficiently important to justify an intrusion on the
Article II interests of the Presidency.”).
216. Id. (“The Nixon standard also reduces the risk of subjecting a President
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There are two notable differences between the Nixon standard and
the issue in Trump. First, the Nixon standard dealt with federal
criminal subpoenas, not state criminal subpoenas.217 Second, in
which Justice Kavanaugh recognizes, the Nixon Court used that
standard in a different Article II context than what applies in this
case.218 However, Justice Kavanaugh states that he would still
apply that standard to the present case.219 He explains that a state
criminal subpoena raises Article II and Supremacy Clause issues
because a state prosecutor could use subpoenas to interfere with the
President’s duties.220
In applying the Nixon standard, Justice Kavanaugh deviates
from the majority opinion, which did not apply it.221 He reiterates
that he would do so because of the need to balance the criminal
process and the Article II interests.222 In differentiating from the
majority, however, he emphasizes that the majority opinion did
account for the protections the Constitution provides the President
in terms of state criminal subpoenas. 223 He then lists out all the
ways the majority opinion explains the circumstances in which a
state prosecutor cannot issue a subpoena. 224
to unwarranted burdens, because it provides that a prosecutor may obtain a
President’s information only in certain defined circumstances.”).
217. See id. (stating that “[t]he longstanding precedent that has applied to
federal criminal subpoenas for official, privileged Executive Branch
information” is the Nixon standard).
218. Id. (“[T]he Court adopted the Nixon standard in a different Article II
context – there, involving the confidentiality of official, privileged
information.”).
219. See Solomon-Strauss, supra note 44 (stating that Justice Kavanaugh
“would have applied the heightened need standard from United States v. Nixon
– which applies to executive privilege over official papers – to the personal
papers in this case”).
220. See Trump, 140 S. Ct. at 2432 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (explaining
that “[a] state criminal subpoena to a President raises Article II and Supremacy
Clause issues because of the potential for a state prosecutor to use the criminal
process and issue subpoenas in a way that interferes with the President’s
duties, through harassment or diversion”).
221. See id. (stating that “[t]he majority opinion does not apply the Nixon
standard in this distinct Article II context, as I would have done”).
222. Id. (“Because this case again entails a clash between the interests of
the criminal process and the Article II interests of the Presidency, [Justice
Kavanaugh] would apply the longstanding Nixon ‘demonstrated, specific’
standard to this case.”) (quoting Nixon, 418 U.S. at 713).
223. See id. at 2431-32 (stating that “the majority opinion correctly
concludes based on precedent that Article II and the Supremacy Clause…
supply some protection for the Presidency against state criminal subpoenas of
this sort[,]” and that it “appropriately takes account of some important concerns
that also animate Nixon and the Constitution’s balance of powers”).
224. See id. at 2433 (stating that “[t]he majority opinion explains that a state
prosecutor may not issue a subpoena for a President’s personal information out
of bad faith, malice, or an intent to harass a President; as a result of
prosecutorial impropriety; to seek information that is not relevant to an
investigation; that is overly broad or unduly burdensome; to manipulate,
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Justice Kavanaugh concludes by recognizing that lower courts
will likely ask questions that could potentially taper the differences
between his approach and the other opinions in this case.225 He goes
on to list those questions that lower courts will likely ask, which all
entail the balancing test between the State’s interests and the
Article II interests on which he bases his opinion.226

D. Justice Thomas’ Dissenting Opinion
Justice Thomas agrees with the majority that there should be
no heightened standard for the issuance of a state criminal
subpoena to a sitting President, but he does so for different
reasons.227 Justice Thomas also agrees with the majority that the
President is not entitled to absolute immunity from the issuance of
the subpoena.228 However, he does so under a different analysis
than the majority does, using an originalist approach based on the
text of the Constitution.229 Although he agrees with the majority
regarding the issuance of a subpoena, he focuses his dissent on the
basis that the President “may be entitled to relief against its
enforcement.”230 As such, he dissents from the majority and agrees
“with the President that the proper course is to vacate and
remand.”231

influence, or retaliate against a President’s official acts or policy decisions; or in
a way that would impede, conflict with, or interfere with a President’s official
duties”).
225. See id. (observing that “[i]n the end, much may depend on how the
majority opinion’s various standards are applied in the future years and
decades”); see also Solomon-Strauss, supra note 44 (explaining that
“Kavanaugh observes that, in practice, lower courts will likely ask questions
about the subpoena that may in effect narrow the differences between his
approach and the majority’s”).
226. See Trump, 140 S. Ct. at 2433 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (stating that
lower courts will have to begin with “why the State wants the information; why
and how much the State needs the information, including whether the State
could obtain the information elsewhere; and whether compliance with the
subpoena would unduly burden or interfere with a President’s official duties”).
227. Id. at 2439, n. 3 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Under a heightened-need
standard, a grand jury with only the usual need for particular information
would be refused it when the President is perfectly able to comply, while a grand
jury with a heightened need would be entitled to it even if compliance would
place undue obligations on the President . . . [and] [t]his makes little sense” and
“[Thomas] would leave questions of the grand jury’s need to state law.”).
228. Id. at 2434.
229. See id. (stating that he reaches this conclusion “based on the text of the
Constitution” rather than the majority’s “primarily functionalist analysis”).
230. Id. (emphasis in original).
231. Id.
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1. The President has no Absolute Immunity as to the
Issuance of the Subpoena
Justice Thomas argues, based on Chief Justice Marshall’s
interpretation under Burr, the “better reading of the text of the
Constitution is that the President has no absolute immunity from
the issuance of a grand jury subpoena.” 232 Justice Thomas “agree[s]
with the majority that the President is not entitled to absolute
immunity from issuance of the subpoena.” 233 He largely relies on
the text of the Constitution and Burr to show that the President “is
not absolutely immune from the subpoena’s issuance.”234
2. The Enforcement of the Subpoena
The main section of Justice Thomas’ dissent focuses on his
reasoning that the President may be entitled to relief on the
enforcement of the subpoena, which the majority did not accept. 235
Although he agrees with the majority regarding the issuance of the
subpoena, he states that the President “may be entitled to relief
against its enforcement[,]” and therefore disagrees with the
majority’s decision not to vacate and remand to address that
question.236 He argues that “[i]f the President can show that ‘his
duties as chief magistrate demand his whole time for national
objects,’ he is entitled to relief from enforcement of the subpoena.” 237
In other words, “[i]f the President is unable to comply because of his
official duties, then he is entitled to injunctive and declaratory
relief.”238 On vacate and remand, Justice Thomas would instruct the
lower courts to apply this Burr standard.239 This standard, he
states, would apply at both the state and federal level. 240 He then
explains that the lower courts must look at two dynamics with how
the Burr standard works.241

232. Id. at 2436.
233. Id. at 2434 (emphasis in original).
234. Solomon-Strauss, supra note 44.
235. Trump, 140 S. Ct. at 2436 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The majority
recognizes that the President can seek relief from enforcement, but it does not
vacate and remand for the lower courts to address this question.”).
236. Id. at 2434, 2436 (emphasis in original); (“The majority recognizes that
the President can seek relief from enforcement, but it does not vacate and
remand for the lower courts to address this question.”).
237. Id. at 2434 (quoting Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 34).
238. Id. at 2436.
239. Id.
240. Solomon-Strauss, supra note 44 (“This standard applies whether the
subpoena is issued at the state or federal level.”).
241. Id.
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a. The President has vast responsibilities
The first dynamic Justice Thomas lays out is that courts must
look at how the “President has vast responsibilities both abroad and
at home.”242 He references various Article II clauses, both
“enumerated” and “residual,” that give power to the President.243
The President’s enumerated responsibilities abroad include
protecting national security,244 being the “Commander in Chief of
the Army and Navy of the United States,”245 making treaties with
foreign countries,246 and appointing and “receiv[ing] Ambassadors
and other public Ministers.”247 Justice Thomas explains that the
Constitution also grants the President residual responsibilities
abroad, as well.248
The President’s enumerated domestic powers include
“grant[ing] Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United
States,”249 appointing “Judges of the supreme Court, and all other
Officers of the United States,”250 and giving “the Congress
Information of the State of the Union.”251 Justice Thomas explains
that the Vesting Clause252 and Take Care Clause253 of Article II
implicate that the President has residual domestic powers, as
well.254
Justice Thomas explains these enumerated and residual
242. Trump, 140 S. Ct. at 2437 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
243. Id. at 2437-38.
244. Id. at 2437 (“The Founders gave the President ‘primary responsibility
– along with the necessary power – to protect the national security and to
conduct the Nation’s foreign relations.’”) (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S.
507, 580 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting)).
245. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
246. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“He shall have Power, by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties[.]”).
247. U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 2-3.
248. Trump, 140 S. Ct. at 2437 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Constitution
‘vests the residual foreign affairs powers of the Federal Government – i.e., those
not specifically enumerated in the Constitution – in the President.’”) (quoting
Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U.S. 1, 33 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment
in part and dissenting in part).
249. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (“[H]e shall have Power to grant Reprieves
and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of
Impeachment.”).
250. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[He] shall appoint… Judges of the
supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments
are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by
Law[.]”).
251. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (“He shall from time to time give to the Congress
Information of the State of the Union, and recommend to their Consideration
such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient[.]”).
252. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (“The executive Power shall be vested in a
President of the United States of America.”).
253. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (“[H]e shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed[.]”).
254. Trump, 140 S. Ct. at 2437-38.
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powers of the President to demonstrate all the “demands on the
President’s time and the importance of his tasks [that] are
extraordinary.”255 He also does so to help lower courts understand
the Presidency “in deciding whether to enforce a subpoena for the
President’s documents.”256 He references that a subpoena puts
various demands on a President even when he is not directly
engaged in responding to them.257 In doing so, Justice Thomas is
suggesting that it is irrelevant that the subpoena was to the thirdparty, Mazars, and not directly to the President.258
b. The courts are poorly situated
The second dynamic Justice Thomas lays out is that “courts are
poorly situated to conduct a searching review of the President’s
assertion that he is unable to comply” with a subpoena. 259 He bases
this on the grounds that judges are not in the best spot to review
what the President asserts in regard to withholding information.260
He states that “[e]ven with perfect information courts lack the
institutional competence to engage in a searching review of the
President’s reasons for not complying with a subpoena.” 261 In sum,
Justice Thomas explains that courts “do not have the access to the
information or the expertise required to deny a president’s assertion
that he is unable to comply with a subpoena.” 262
Based on those two dynamics, Justice Thomas dissents and
expresses that he would vacate the Second Circuit’s decision and
remand the case to the district court to address the issue on the
enforcement of the subpoena. 263

255. Id. at 2438.
256. Id.
257. See id. (explaining that “[a] subpoena imposes both demands on the
President’s limited time and a mental burden, even when the President is not
directly engaged in complying”).
258. Id.
259. Id. at 2437.
260. Id. at 2438 (“Judges ‘simply lack the relevant information and expertise
to second-guess determinations made by the President based on information
properly withheld.”) (quoting Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 583).
261. Id. at 2439.
262. Solomon-Strauss, supra note 44.
263. Trump, 140 S. Ct. at 2439 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (holding that he
“would vacate and remand to allow the District Court to determine whether
enforcement of this subpoena should be enjoined” which the majority
“inexplicably fail[ed] to address”); Solomon-Strauss, supra note 44 (“Thomas
would therefore have vacated the Second Circuit’s decision and remanded it to
determine if the enforcement of the subpoena should be enjoined.”) (emphasis in
original).
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E. Justice Alito’s Dissenting Opinion
In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice Alito agrees with the
eight other Justices that absolute immunity is not appropriate in
this case.264 He dissents because he would have applied a
heightened standard for this type of subpoena, in which he lays out
a three-part test that he believes a prosecutor should be required to
meet before the subpoena can be enforced. 265
He begins by addressing how significant this case is, and how
the Court’s decision will affect all future Presidents.266 He centers
his opinion around “whether the Constitution imposes restrictions
on a State’s deployment of its criminal law enforcement powers
against a sitting President.”267 If the Constitution does not set limits
to this, then local prosecutors may in fact prosecute a sitting
President, and thus, the subpoena may be enforced.268 Conversely,
“if the Constitution does not permit a State to prosecute a sitting
President, the next logical question is whether the Constitution
restrains any other prosecutorial or investigative weapons.” 269 As
such, Justice Alito states that there are questions as to the
structural features of the Constitution that must be addressed – the
first being “the nature and role of the Presidency” and the second
being federalism.270

264. See Trump, 140 S. Ct. at 2429 (majority opinion) (stating that the
Court’s “dissenting colleagues agree” with the conclusion “that absolute
immunity is [not] necessary or appropriate under Article II or the Supremacy
Clause”); see also id. at 2448 (Alito, J., dissenting) (stating he “agree[s] with the
Court that not all such subpoenas should be barred”); see also Solomon-Strauss,
supra note 44 (stating that “the justices were unanimous that President Trump
was not absolutely immune from a state court criminal subpoena to a third
party for his financial records”).
265. See Trump, 140 S. Ct. at 2448 (Alito, J., dissenting) (stating that “a
subpoena like the one now before [the Court] should not be enforced unless it
meets a test that takes into account the need to prevent interference with a
President’s discharge of the responsibilities of the office”); see also SolomonStrauss, supra note 44 (stating that Justice Alito “would have applied a
heightened standard for the subpoena”).
266. Trump, 140 S. Ct. at 2439 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“This case is almost
certain to be portrayed as a case about the current President…, but the case
has a much deeper significance… [as] what the Court holds today will also affect
all future Presidents – which is to say, it will affect the Presidency, and that is
a matter of great and lasting importance to the Nation.”).
267. Id. at 2439-40.
268. Id. at 2440 (“If the Constitution sets no such limits, then a local
prosecutor may prosecute a sitting President[,] [a]nd if that is allowed, it follows
a fortiori that the subpoena at issue can be enforced.”).
269. Id.
270. See id. at 2440, 2442 (stating that there “are important questions that
go to the very structure of the Government created by the Constitution[,]” and
“two important structural features must be taken into account[,]” those being
the “nature and role of the Presidency[,]” and “the relationship between the
Federal Government and the States”).
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1. Structural Features of the Constitution
a. Nature and role of the Presidency
The first structural feature is “the nature and role of the
Presidency.”271 In many respects, Justice Alito, just like Justice
Thomas, does so to establish how important the Presidency is, and
to show the demands and burdens that are constantly on the
President.272 Justice Alito explains that, unlike Congress and the
Court, the President is the sole person in his respective branch of
the government.273 He explains the President is the “Commander in
Chief of the Armed Forces,”274 which requires him to “be responsible
for the defense of the country from the moment he enters office until
the moment he leaves.”275 The President is also the leader in
“foreign relations[,]” who decides “whether to recognize foreign
governments[.]”276 In addition to making treaties and “meet[ing]
with foreign leaders,” the President also “oversees the work of the
State Department and intelligence agencies[.]”277 Justice Alito
explains that because the Vesting and Take Care Clauses make the
President the sole “head of the Executive Branch,” he “is ultimately
responsible for everything done by all the departments and agencies
of the Federal Government and a federal civil work force that
includes millions of employees.”278 All of these responsibilities,
Justice Alito explains, “impose enormous burdens on the time and
energy of any occupant of the Presidency.”279 Justice Alito makes
the point that “the country would be at risk” and the “constitutional
system could not operate,” unless the President “is able at all times
to carry out the responsibilities of the office.”280
b. Federalism
The second structural feature Justice Alito describes is “the
relationship between the Federal Government and the States.” 281
271. Id. at 2440.
272. Compare id. at 2441-42 (explaining that the “weighty responsibilities
impose enormous burdens on the time and energy of any occupant of the
Presidency” and that “the Nation cannot be safely left without a functioning
President for even a brief time”), with id. at 2438 (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(demonstrating that there are “demands on the President’s time and the
importance of his tasks are extraordinary”).
273. Trump, 140 S. Ct. at 2440 (Alito, J., dissenting).
274. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1).
275. Trump, 140 S. Ct. at 2440 (Alito, J., dissenting).
276. Id. (citing Zivotofsky, 576 U.S. 1).
277. Id.
278. Id. at 2441.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 2442.
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He explains the Constitution “provided for the Federal Government
to be independent of and, within its allotted sphere, supreme over
the States… [and] a State may not block or interfere with the lawful
work of the National Government.”282 Justice Alito cites to former
Chief Justice John Marshall just like Chief Justice Roberts, but
cites Marshall’s opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland to emphasize the
concept of federalism.283 He explains that case law post-McCulloch
has built on the “principle that ‘the activities of the Federal
Government are free from regulation by any State [and] [n]o other
adjustment of competing enactments or legal principles is
possible.’”284
Justice Alito lays out these two structural features to “argue
that ‘a State’s sovereign power to enforce its criminal laws must
accommodate’ the [P]resident’s ‘indispensable’ constitutional
role.”285 Justice Alito argues that this “must be the rule with respect
to a state prosecution of a sitting President.”286
2. State Criminal Subpoenas to the President
a. The role the Constitution has with respect to the state
prosecution of a President
Justice Alito points out that the Constitution clearly sets out
that a President cannot be prosecuted while in office. 287 He
references that the Framers put the impeachment and removal
provisions in the Constitution to “provide for the possibility that a
President might be implicated in the commission of a serious
offense, and they did not want the country to be forced to endure
such a President for the remainder of his term in office.” 288 He
explains how the Framers put these powers in the hands of the
House of Representatives and the Senate, and “not a single
prosecutor or the members of a local grand jury.”289

282. Id.
283. Id. (“Marshall recognized that the States retained the ‘sovereign’ power
to tax persons and entities within their jurisdiction, but this power, he
explained, ‘is subordinate to, and may be controlled by the constitution of the
United States.’”) (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 427, 429).
284. Id. at 2443 (quoting Mayo, 319 U.S. at 445).
285. Solomon-Strauss, supra note 44 (quoting Trump, 140 S. Ct. at 2444
(Alito, J., dissenting)).
286. Trump, 140 S. Ct. at 2444 (Alito, J., dissenting).
287. Id. (“Both the structure of the Government established by the
Constitution and the Constitution’s provisions on the impeachment and
removal of a President make it clear that the prosecution of a sitting President
is out of the question.”).
288. Id.
289. Id.
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b. The impossibility of a state criminal prosecution against
a sitting President
Justice Alito goes on to state that it is impossible for a state
criminal prosecution to be enforced against the President. 290 He
brings up how neither District Attorney Vance, the district court,
nor the Second Circuit were “willing to concede the fundamental
point that a sitting President may not be prosecuted by a local
district attorney.”291 He explains how ridiculous it would be if a
sitting President was in fact prosecuted by a local grand jury, and
states the principle that “legal proceedings involving a sitting
President must take the responsibilities and demands of the office
into account.”292
Justice Alito attacks the majority’s statements that “no man is
above the law” and “the public has a right to every man’s
evidence.”293 He states these are true statements but argues that
because of the indispensability of the President’s role, “there is no
question that … in some instances . . . the application of laws [must]
“be adjusted at least until” the end of the President’s term in
office.294
c.

The subpoena in this case

Justice Alito next addresses the exact subpoena at issue in this
case.295 He recognizes the subpoena at issue was to a third party,
and how “compliance would not require much work on the
President’s part” since it is “just one subpoena.” 296 However, he
states it does not matter that it was issued to a third-party, and that
deciding a case based on this line would be too confusing for the
courts.297 Instead, he states the Court should “adopt a rule to
address how subpoenas could affect or potentially harass the

290. See Solomon-Strauss, supra note 44 (explaining that Justice Alito
“describ[es] what he sees as the essential impossibility of a state criminal
prosecution against the [P]resident”).
291. Trump, 140 S. Ct. at 2445 (Alito, J., dissenting).
292. Id. at 2445-46.
293. Id. at 2446 (quoting Trump, 140 S. Ct. at 2420).
294. Id. (“[T]here is no question that the nature of the office demands in
some instances that the application of laws be adjusted at least until the
person’s term in office ends.”).
295. Solomon-Strauss, supra note 44 (“After describing what he sees as the
essential impossibility of a state criminal prosecution against the [P]resident,
Alito addresses the subpoena itself.”).
296. Trump, 140 S. Ct. at 2446 (Alito, J., dissenting).
297. Id. (“Drawing a line based on such factors would involve the same sort
of ‘perplexing inquiry, so unfit for the judicial department’ that Marshall
rejected in [McCulloch v. Maryland].”) (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
at 430).
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President.”298 He first describes the “burdens imposed by the
shadow of a potential criminal prosecution[.]”299 He writes that it is
“unrealistic to think that the prospect of possible criminal
prosecution will not interfere with the performance of the duties of
the office.”300 He next describes the “incentives for state and local
prosecutors to harass the president.”301 He explains how there are
“more than 2,300 local prosecutors and district attorneys in the
country[,]” and that many of them “are elected and . . . have
ambitions for higher elected office.”302 Because of this, the President
may be a target for local prosecutors, but that this “would
undermine our constitutional structure.”303 He then circles back to
his federalism argument, and how the Framers “successfully
opposed a proposal to vest the impeachment power in state
legislatures” at the “Constitutional Convention.”304
d. The heightened standard three-part test
As a result, Justice Alito argues that a subpoena like this one
should meet a heightened test to take into account the President’s
duties.305 He makes the point that the Court “should not treat this
subpoena like an ordinary grand jury subpoena and should not
relegate a President to the meager defenses that are available when
an ordinary grand jury subpoena is challenged.”306 This is where
Justice Alito disagrees with the majority’s opinion.307
The “Presidency deserves greater protection[]” that is more
than the “meager defenses” that the majority’s opinion sets out. 308
Justice Alito’s proposed test would require a prosecutor: “(1) to
provide at least a general description of the possible offenses that
are under investigation, (2) to outline how the subpoenaed records
relate to those offenses, and (3) to explain why it is necessary for
production to occur while the President is still in office.” 309
Justice Alito then applies those three requirements to this case
to demonstrate what District Attorney Vance should have done. 310
He writes that Vance “should be required to answer questions about
298. Solomon-Strauss, supra note 44.
299. Id.
300. Trump, 140 S. Ct. at 2447 (Alito, J., dissenting).
301. Solomon-Strauss, supra note 44.
302. Trump, 140 S. Ct. at 2447 (Alito, J., dissenting).
303. Id.
304. Id. at 2448.
305. Id. (“In light of the above, a subpoena like the one now before [the
Court] should not be enforced unless it meets a test that takes into account the
need to prevent interference with a President’s discharge of the responsibilities
of the office.”).
306. Id. at 2449.
307. Solomon-Strauss, supra note 44.
308. Trump, 140 S. Ct. at 2449 (Alito, J., dissenting).
309. Id.
310. Id.
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the scope of the subpoena and the need for the [P]resident’s records
in particular.”311 As to the scope, Justice Alito states how similar it
is to the subpoenas issued by the House of Representatives, and so
“[i]t is appropriate to ask the district attorney to explain the need
for the various items that the subpoena covers.”312 Additionally,
Vance should explain why “it is important that the information in
question be obtained from the President’s records rather than
another source.”313 And that Vance should “set out why he finds it
necessary that the records be produced now as opposed to when the
President leaves office.”314 Justice Alito states that “[t]here may be
other good reasons why immediate enforcement is important . . . but
if a prosecutor believes that immediate enforcement is needed for
such a reason, the prosecutor should be required to provide a
reasonably specific explanation why that is so and why alternative
means . . . would not suffice.” 315
3. The Majority’s Opinion Provides no Protection for the
President
Justice Alito finishes his opinion by addressing the problems
that will result from the majority’s opinion.316 He disagrees with the
majority’s opinion in terms of the protection of the Presidency and
then lists out why in terms of grand jury reasons.317 He then
addresses and disagrees with the majority’s use of precedent.318
a. Grand jury reasoning
Justice Alito “disagrees with the majority’s view of what he
sees as the heightened risk of harassment from state prosecutors;
[and] what he worries are inadequately strong grand jury secrecy
rules[.]”319 He argues that “grand jury secrecy rules are of limited
value as safeguards against harassment.”320 This is, in part,
because in New York, “the decision whether to disclose grand jury
evidence is committed to the discretion of the supervising judge
under a test that simply balances the need for secrecy against ‘the
public interest.’”321 He states that judges in New York could very
311. Solomon-Strauss, supra note 44.
312. Trump, 140 S. Ct. at 2449 (Alito, J., dissenting).
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Id. at 2449-50.
316. Id. at 2451 (“For all practical purposes, the Court’s decision places a
sitting President in the same unenviable position as any other person whose
records are subpoenaed by a grand jury.”).
317. Id. at 2450-51.
318. Solomon-Strauss, supra note 44.
319. Id.
320. Trump, 140 S. Ct. at 2450 (Alito, J., dissenting).
321. Id. (quoting In re District Attorney of Suffolk Cnty., 58 N.Y.2d at 444).
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possibly find that it is in the public’s interest, and that subpoenaed
information is highly sought after by the media.322 He disputes the
majority’s statement “that ‘grand juries are prohibited from
engaging’ in ‘fishing expeditions’” by noting how a grand jury
subpoena in New York does not need to be “supported by probable
cause.”323 He also argues that there is “limited usefulness of the
[P]resident’s ability to argue that his constitutional duties would be
impeded by compliance with subpoena.” 324 He reasons that this is
the case because the majority’s opinion “makes clear that any
stigma or damage to a President’s reputation” cannot be made as
an objection.325 Further, he writes that the majority’s reasoning
that the “President [can] challenge a subpoena by ‘an affirmative
showing of impropriety,’ including ‘bad faith’” is useless, as these
types of objections almost never prevail.326 As such, Justice Alito
argues that the majority’s opinion does not protect the President as
much as it should.327
b. The majority’s use of precedent
To end his opinion, Justice Alito “addresses the majority’s use
of precedent.”328 He first distinguishes this case from Burr, in which
the majority mistakenly relies upon with respect to important
differences.329 The first difference, Justice Alito explains, is that
unlike the subpoena in Burr, this one is not seeking “exculpatory
evidence from the very man [President Jefferson] who was
orchestrating the prosecution.”330 The second difference is that in
the Burr trial, “the nature of the criminal case meant that Burr
couldn’t postpone his request until [President] Jefferson was out of
office.”331 The third difference is that Burr lacked the “federalism
concerns that lie at the heart of the present case.”332
Justice Alito writes that the majority’s other examples of
presidential subpoenas actually show that Presidents have been
322. Id.
323. Id. (quoting Trump, 140 S. Ct. at 2428 (majority opinion)); In re Nassau
Cnty. Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated June 24, 2003, 4 N.Y.3d at 67778.
324. Solomon-Strauss, supra note 44.
325. Trump, 140 S. Ct. at 2450 (Alito, J., dissenting).
326. Id. at 2451 (quoting Trump, 140 S. Ct. at 2428 (majority opinion)).
327. See id. (stating that “[f]or all practical purposes, the Court’s decision
places a sitting President in the same unenviable position as any other person
whose records are subpoenaed by a grand jury”).
328. Solomon-Strauss, supra note 44.
329. Trump, 140 S. Ct. at 2451 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court relies on
Marshall’s ruling in the Burr trial, but the Court ignores important differences
between the situation in that case and the situation here.”).
330. Id.
331. Solomon-Strauss, supra note 44.
332. Trump, 140 S. Ct. at 2451 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Third, because the
case was prosecuted in federal court under federal law, it entirely lacked the
federalism concerns that lie at the heart of the present case.”).
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given leeway not otherwise afforded “to an ordinary person,
including not being forced to testify in person.”333 Justice Alito notes
that testifying in person is “almost always required when a witness
is subpoenaed to testify at a criminal trial or before a grand
jury[.]”334 The majority’s examples of President Ford and President
Carter, which “occurred under modern federal rules of procedure
and allow[ed] them to testify by deposition, represent a sharp
departure from conventional practice.”335
He then distinguishes this case from the majority’s citations to
Nixon and Clinton.336 Justice Alito writes that “both the criminal
nature of the investigation” in this case and “its origin in state court
distinguishes it” from those cases.337 He states that in Nixon, “the
trial was in federal court [and] there was no issue of federalism” and
that the “Court refused to order that the subpoena be quashed
because of the ‘demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a pending
criminal trial.’”338 Justice Alito states this is exactly what is lacking
in this case.339 Turning to Clinton, Justice Alito distinguishes it
from this case because Clinton arose in federal court and was a civil
suit.340 He argues that because this case essentially arose in state
court since it was a state district attorney, this case is different than
Nixon and Clinton.341
Justice Alito concludes by stating how important it is to
address this issue since the “subpoena at issue here is
unprecedented.”342 He reiterates that the majority’s decision “fails
to provide the President with adequate safeguards against state
and local prosecutors around the country.” 343 He states that
“[r]espect for the structure of the Government created by the
Constitution demands greater protection for an institution that is
vital to the Nation’s safety and well-being.”344

IV.

PERSONAL ANALYSIS

The problem with the Court’s opinion does not lie in its holding
that the President is not entitled to absolute immunity under
Article II – all nine Justices agree that the President is not
333. Solomon-Strauss, supra note 44.
334. Trump, 140 S. Ct. at 2451 (Alito, J., dissenting).
335. Id.
336. Id. at 2452.
337. Solomon-Strauss, supra note 44.
338. Trump, 140 S. Ct. at 2452 (Alito, J., dissenting) (quoting Nixon, 418
U.S. at 713).
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. Solomon-Strauss, supra note 44.
344. Trump, 140 S. Ct. at 2452 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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absolutely immune from the issuance of a state criminal subpoena
for personal papers.345 I do not contest this. Instead, the problem
rests with the Court rejecting a heightened need standard, as this
does not provide enough protection for a sitting President.346 I
contend the Court should adopt a test similar to the one Justice
Alito would adopt before a state criminal subpoena can be
enforced.347 This is, in large part, because of the fact that this was
the first time a state subpoena of this kind has occurred. There is a
great chance it could happen again, and as such, a set test should
be adopted.348

A. The Court Should Adopt a Set Rule That Will
Provide Greater Protection to the President
The Court should adopt the three-part test that Justice Alito
lays out in his dissenting opinion.349 For a subpoena of this kind to
be enforced, this test would require a state or local prosecutor “(1)
to provide at least a general description of the possible offenses that
are under investigation, (2) to outline how the subpoenaed records
relate to those offenses, and (3) to explain why it is important that
the records be produced and why it is necessary for production to
occur while the President is still in office.” 350 Although Justice
Kavanaugh would “apply the longstanding Nixon ‘demonstrated,
specific need’ standard[,]” that standard is not a set rule, and would
leave questions for future courts in these types of situations, which
have the likely potential to occur again.351 Instead, a set rule is
needed and should be adopted, because the Court’s decision “will
345. Solomon-Strauss, supra note 44 (“Writing in four separate opinions, the
justices were unanimous that President Trump was not absolutely immune
from a state court criminal subpoena to a third party for his financial records.”).
346. See Trump, 140 S. Ct. at 2431 (holding that “the President is… [not]
entitled to a heightened standard of need”); see also Trump, 140 S. Ct. at 2449
(Alito, J., dissenting) (stating that “[t]he Presidency deserves greater
protection”).
347. Id. at 2449 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“[A] prosecutor should be required (1)
to provide at least a general description of the possible offenses that are under
investigation, (2) to outline how the subpoenaed records relate to those offenses,
and (3) to explain why it is important that the records be produced and why it
is necessary for production to occur while the President is still in office.”).
348. Id. at 2424-25 (majority opinion) (“Here we are confronted for the first
time with a subpoena issued to the President by a local grand jury operating
under the supervision of a state court.”) (emphasis in original).
349. Id. at 2449 (Alito, J., dissenting).
350. Id.
351. Id. at 2432 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (quoting Nixon, 418 U.S. at
713); Id. at 2433 (“[L]ower courts in cases of this sort involving a President will
almost invariably have to begin by delving into why the State wants the
information; why and how much the State needs the information, including
whether the State could obtain the information elsewhere; and whether
compliance with the subpoena would unduly burden or interfere with a
President’s official duties.”).
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also affect all future Presidents – which is to say it will affect the
Presidency, and that is a matter of great and lasting importance to
the Nation.”352
This rule should be adopted due to politically motivated state
or local prosecutors potentially harassing the President, and the
potential effect the enforcement of a subpoena could have on the
functioning of the Presidency and the Nation as a whole. Without
adopting a heightened set rule prior to enforcement, the Court has
created a dangerous slippery slope in allowing state and local
prosecutors across the Nation to issue and enforce state criminal
subpoenas to future presidents without showing valid reasons. This
rule “would not undermine any legitimate state interests” and
would not create any additional burdens to state and local
prosecutors wishing to enforce a state criminal subpoena against a
sitting President.353
Across the United States, there are “2,330 chief prosecutors’
offices[.]”354 Many of these prosecutors are elected by their localities
and in only a few states are these prosecutors appointed.355 Indeed,
District Attorney Vance, the local prosecutor at issue in this case,
was elected to office and ran as a Democrat.356 Because of this
election process, district attorneys will seek “to produce the range
of outcomes the public desires” and they also “presumably wish to
keep their jobs, move up to higher office, or both.”357 This creates
the incentive for elected district attorneys “to generate the level and
distribution of prosecutions the public wants[.]”358 It follows that
“[i]f a sitting President is intensely unpopular in a particular
district – and that is a common condition – targeting the President
may be an alluring and effective electoral strategy.”359 In other
words, a “state prosecutor in a community where the President is
unpopular. . . would have significant incentives to win votes by
investigating the President.”360
This is not to mean all state and local prosecutors will be
politically motivated, or that they will not perform their duties in
352. Id. at 2439 (Alito, J., dissenting).
353. Id. at 2450.
354. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 95.
355. Prosecution: History of the Public Prosecutor, The Prosecutor As An
Elected Local Official, www.law.jrank.org/pages/1859/Prosecution-HistoryPublic-Prosecutor-prosecutor-an-elected-local-official.html
[perma.cc/NN7ZRM7Q] (last visited Nov. 21, 2020).
356. David W. Chen and John Eligon, Vance is Winner in Primary Vote to
Replace Morgenthau, N.Y. TIMES (Sep. 15, 2009), www.nytimes.com/2009/09/16/
nyregion/16election.html?hp [perma.cc/4CP8-6QFP]
357. William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100
MICH. L. REV. 505, 533 (2001).
358. Id.
359. Trump, 140 S. Ct. at 2447 (Alito, J., dissenting).
360. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at
18, Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412 (2020) (No. 19-635)).
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the utmost responsible fashion. Nor am I suggesting District
Attorney Vance was ill-motivated in regard to the subpoena in this
case.361 Rather, the point is that “there is a very real risk that some
[prosecutors] will not” perform their duties in a responsible
manner.362 This is especially true today, where our country is more
politically divided than ever.363 Indeed, in the 2018 New York State
attorney general election, the “primary candidates practically
tripped over one another promising to take [the President] to
court.”364 And the idea of using this office to target the President is
not limited to the state of New York.365
All of this boils down to the reality that, due to the state of our
polarized Nation today, state and local prosecutors are going to
target the President with potentially harassing investigations. If
this is allowed, which the Court is unanimously agreeing to, then
there needs to be a set rule adopted before these issued subpoenas
can be enforced. 366 Without such a heightened set rule on
enforceability, state and local prosecutors across the country will
get the idea that they can go out and issue subpoenas to future
presidents and subsequently get them enforced.367 Allowing the
361. But see Michael R. Sisak, Criminal Probe, Legal Fights Await Trump
after White House, ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWS (Nov. 20, 2020), www.apnews.com/
article/donald-trump-new-york-campaign-finance-cyrus-vance-jr-manhattanf841d62dbf6d1a8ba2949bc577858f6e [perma.cc/GR83-WBS3] (explaining the
viewpoint that District Attorney Vance’s inquiries into the President could “be
seen as political retaliation” due to the “country [being] so sharply polarized in
2020”) (quoting Meena Bose, Executive Director of the Peter S. Kalikow Center
for the Study of the American Presidency at Hofstra University) (internal
quotations omitted).
362. Trump, 140 S. Ct. at 2450 (Alito, J., dissenting); see Brief for the United
States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 22, Trump, 140 S. Ct. 2412
(No. 19-635)) (stating that “[t]he sheer number of district attorneys also
increases the likelihood of finding at least one who is willing to target the
President, or who simply gives inadequate weight to the extraordinary burdens
imposed by a subpoena to the President”).
363. See Michael Dimock and Richard Wike, America is Exceptional in the
Nature of its Political Divide, FACTTANK (Nov. 13, 2020), www.pewresearch.org/
fact-tank/2020/11/13/america-is-exceptional-in-the-nature-of-its-politicaldivide/ [perma.cc/N6EP-BUEP] (stating that “Americans have rarely been as
polarized as they are today”).
364. Emma Platoff, America’s Weaponized Attorneys General, ATLANTIC
(Oct. 28, 2018), www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/10/both-republicans
-and-democrats-have-weaponized-their-ags/574093/ [perma.cc/DZ26-Z8LN].
365. See Jeffery C. Mays, N.Y.’s New Attorney General Is Targeting Trump.
Will Judges See a ‘Political Vendetta?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 31, 2018),
www.nytimes.com/2018/12/31/nyregion/tish-james-attorney-generaltrump.html [perma.cc/4WZX-KYWM] (stating that “[d]emocratic attorney
generals across the country… have repeatedly used their offices to confront [the
President]”).
366. See Trump, 140 S. Ct. at 2429 (stating that “the Court is unanimous”
in concluding that the President is not absolutely immune from the issuance of
a state criminal subpoena).
367. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner
at 28, Trump, 140 S. Ct. 2412 (No. 19-635) (stating that “[a] heightened
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New York County District Attorney to proceed on enforceability
without requiring a heightened standard, as the Court’s majority
opinion did, will create a slippery slope in allowing state and local
prosecutors across the country to do the same.368
This rule should also be adopted due to the potential effect the
enforcement of a state criminal subpoena could have on the
functioning of the Presidency and the Nation as a whole. The
President is placed in a unique role in the federal government and
has “responsibilities that are essential to the country’s safety and
wellbeing.”369 These responsibilities and demands of the Presidency
have grown in today’s age, not just in terms of power, but also “in
scope, complexity, [and] degree of difficulty.”370 Even being issued a
criminal subpoena can “easily impair a President’s ‘energetic
performance of [his] constitutional duties.’”371 Further, “any
distraction of the President from his duties . . . has a much bigger
impact on the well-being of the nation and all its People.”372 This is
due to the fact that “our constitutional system could not operate,
and the country would be at risk” unless a President “is able at all
times to carry out the responsibilities of the office.”373 The Twentyfifth Amendment374 “reflects an appreciation that the Nation cannot
be safely left without a functioning President for even a brief
time.”375 The point is not whether a sitting President can actually
be criminally prosecuted while in office.376 Instead, the point is that
the “effect of [enforcing] [state grand jury] subpoenas” can vastly
impact the “functioning of the Presidency[.]” 377 And because of this
potential impact on the Presidency, and in effect, the Nation as a
whole, a state or local prosecutor must be required to meet this
standard would mitigate the risk of harassment”).
368. See Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.), 35, 46 (1868) (stating that
“[i]f one State can do this, so can every other State”).
369. Trump, 140 S. Ct. at 2440 (Alito, J., dissenting); see Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
at 749 (explaining the President “occupies a unique position in the
constitutional scheme”).
370. John Dickerson, The Hardest Job in the World, ATLANTIC (May 2018),
www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/05/a-broken-office/556883
[perma.cc/EN8Y-H7VB].
371. Trump, 140 S. Ct. at 2447 (Alito, J., dissenting) (quoting Cheney, 542
U.S. at 382).
372. Akhil Reed Amar & Brian C. Kalt, The Presidential Privilege Against
Prosecution, 2 NEXUS J. OP. 11, 13 (1997).
373. Trump, 140 S. Ct. at 2441 (Alito, J., dissenting).
374. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, §§ 1, 3-4.
375. Trump, 140 S. Ct. at 2441-42 (Alito, J., dissenting).
376. See Dylan Matthews, The Suddenly Relevant Debate About Whether a
President can be Prosecuted, Explained, VOX (May 17, 2017, 2:40 PM), www.vox.
com/policy-and-politics/2017/5/17/15654158/trump-prosecuted-constitutionimpeachment-prosecutor [perma.cc/BC5V-HJ7B] (explaining how there is
debate over whether a sitting President can be criminally prosecuted while in
office, and how it “has never been tested before”).
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proposed three-part test.
This rule “would not undermine any legitimate state interests”
and would not create any additional burdens on state or local
prosecutors wishing to enforce a state criminal subpoena against a
sitting President.378 Prosecutors could still theoretically be able to
get these types of subpoenas enforced but would simply just have to
provide answers and information to the proposed test. Looking at
the first two parts of the proposed test, it “would not be unduly
burdensome” for a prosecutor to “provide at least a general
description of the possible offenses that are under
investigation[.]”379 Nor would it be “unduly burdensome” for a
district attorney “to outline how the subpoenaed records relate to
those offenses” under investigation.380 If a district attorney truly
has good reasoning as to the enforcement of a subpoena, then it
should not be difficult for him or her to provide information as to
these requirements.
Lastly, looking at the third part of the proposed test, it would
not be “unduly burdensome” for a prosecutor “to explain why it is
important that the records be produced and why it is necessary for
production to occur while the President is still in office.” 381 As
Justice Alito explains, if a district attorney has concerns as to the
statute of limitations expiring, “there are potential solutions to that
problem.”382 Even if this is a concern, there would be no additional
burden for the prosecutor to address that by meeting the proposed
test. Requiring this test would help protect the President from the
enforcement of any unjustified harassing subpoenas issued by state
or local prosecutors. A test like this would ensure “that a prosecutor
may take the extraordinary step of seeking evidence from the
President only when that evidence is essential.”383
The question then might be raised as to where and at what
stage of the legal proceedings should the local or state prosecutor be
required to answer these questions and provide this information.
The answer should be in the federal district courts. These types of
cases will always be challenged by the sitting President, who will
likely sue in federal district court. Indeed, in the case at bar, the
President sued District Attorney Vance in federal district court. 384
Although the federal district court may insert the Younger
378. Id. at 2450.
379. Id. at 2449.
380. Id.
381. Id.
382. Id. (“Even if New York law does not automatically suspend the statute
of limitations for prosecuting a President until he leaves office, it may be
possible to eliminate the problem by waiver.”).
383. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at
28, Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412 (2020) (No. 19-635).
384. Trump, 140 S. Ct. at 2420 (“The President, acting in his personal
capacity, sued the district attorney and Mazars in Federal District Court to
enjoin enforcement of the subpoena.”).
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abstention doctrine,385 as the district court did in this case, this
should still be the time and place where the state or local prosecutor
should be required to provide answers to the proposed test. 386
Having the prosecutor attempt to meet the proposed test at this
stage will get these answers and information into the record for
higher courts to look at in determining whether the prosecutor has
met the test before potentially enforcing the subpoena.

V.

CONCLUSION

In the end, much will be said about President Trump and his
presidency will have an everlasting effect in our Nation’s history.
For many, it may be no surprise that the first time a state criminal
subpoena has been issued to a sitting President came under his
governance. But the impact of a subpoena of this kind is not limited
to him, and it will continue to have an effect on “all future
Presidents” which is “a matter of great and lasting importance to
the Nation.”387 In rejecting a heightened standard of need, the
Court’s holding in Trump has left future Presidents without the
protection that they may need and deserve.388

385. See generally Younger, 401 U.S. 37 (setting forth an abstention
doctrine, which, in part, established that federal courts are required to not
exercise jurisdiction when a plaintiff sought to enjoin a state criminal
prosecution that was still ongoing).
386. Trump, 395 F. Supp. 3d at 290 (abstaining from exercising jurisdiction).
387. Trump, 140 S. Ct. at 2439 (Alito, J., dissenting).
388. Id. at 2452.
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